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This Article discusses the status of federal common law in the wake of 
the Supreme Court's May, 2013 denial of petitioners' writ of certiorari in 
Native Village of Kivalina v. Exxonmobil. A close reading of Supreme Court 
and recent appellate decisions on federal common law as applied to 
transboundary pollution reveals three views on the availability and function 
of federal common law where a federal statute addresses a category of 
environmental harms: presumptive displacement of federal common law 
when a federal statute creates a regulatory approach, presumptive 
coexistence of federal statutory and common law where a federal statute does 
not provide relief for injuries alleged under common law, and case-by-case 
balancing of the interfering effect of federal common law against the injuries 
left unaddressed by federal statutory law. The Court's current approach 
resides somewhere between presumptive displacement and case-by-case 
balancing, and although the Court offers various rationales for this approach 
in its latest federal common law opinion, the most convincing of these is that 
cases involving transboundary pollution, particularly those alleging global 
warming-induced injury, are cumbersome for federal courts to handle as 
common law matters. Allocation of judicial resources is within the Supreme 
Court's discretion to consider in rejecting a case, but it is a far more 
pragmatic than principled rationale, and thus less than satisfying as a court's 
primary reason for denying relief. A more principled approach, advocated by 
Justices Stevens and Blackmun in dissents to two key federal common law 
cases, is that the displacement analysis should begin with the premise that the 
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judicial system aims, first and foremost, to compensate the injured, and that a 
federal common law claim should be displaced only where the legislative-
regulatory regime covering the subject of a common law claim directly 
addresses the injury alleged under common law. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
On May 20, 2013, the Supreme Court denied the Native Village of 
Kivalina's petition for writ of certiorari, thus concluding the saga of a tiny 
native community's struggle to introduce a glimmer of justice into their flight 
from the sea seventy miles north of the Arctic Circle.1 In a public nuisance 
action launched in 2008 in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of 
California, the Alaskan tribe claimed that its retreat from the Chukchi Sea 
was forced by global warming-induced storms to which its village has been 
acutely vulnerable in recent years due to global warming-induced ice melts 
that exposed its shoreline to the ravages of these storms.2 The tribe blamed 
                                                             
1 Native Village of Kivalina v. Exxonmobil, 663 F. Supp. 2d 863, 868–
69 (N.D. Ca. 2009) (The Village is a self-governing, federally-recognized 
Tribe of Inupiat Eskimos established pursuant to the provisions of the Indian 
Reorganization Act of 1934, as amended in 1936. Members of the Village 
reside in Kivalina, which is a unified municipality incorporated under Alaska 
law in 1969 with a population of approximately 400 persons. Kivalina is 
located at the tip of a six-mile long barrier reef, approximately seventy miles 
north of the Arctic Circle, between the Chukchi Sea and the Kivalina and 
Wulik Rivers on the Northwest coast of Alaska.). 
See also Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the 9th Circuit at 5, Native Village of Kivalina v. Exxonmobil (U.S. Feb. 25, 
2013) (No. 12-1072), 2013 WL 794333 (The Native Village of Kivalina and 
the City of Kivalina serve as the governing bodies of an Inupiat Native 
Alaskan village of 400 persons. The Village is situated on a promontory at 
one end of a six-mile barrier island located off the northwest coast of 
Alaska.). 
2 See Native Village of Kivalina, 663 F. Supp. 2d at 869 ("Plaintiffs filed 
their Complaint on February 26, 2008. The Complaint alleged four claims for 
relief: (1) Federal Common Law; Public Nuisance; (2) State Law: Private and 
Public Nuisance; (3) Civil Conspiracy; and (4) Concert of Action." 
(referencing No. cv-08-1138 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 26, 2008)); see also id. ("The 
Kivalina coast is protected by Arctic sea ice that is present during the fall, 
winter and spring. The sea ice, which attaches to the Kivalina coast, acts as a 
barrier against the coastal storms and waves that affect the coast of the 
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twenty-two major fossil-fuel producers for the global warming damages 
suffered.3 
For environmentalists, indigenous rights advocates, and followers of 
David-and-Goliath legal battles, the Kivalina case is of great significance.4 In 
Kivalina, an incontrovertibly innocent party demanded acknowledgment of 
its victimization by a global warming crisis spawned by unbounded industrial 
                                                                                                                              
Chukchi Sea. As a result of global warming, however, the sea ice now 
attaches to the Kivalina coast later in the year and breaks up earlier and is 
thinner and less extensive than before, thus subjecting Kivalina to coastal 
storms waves and surges. The resulting erosion has reached the point where 
Kivalina is becoming uninhabitable. Plaintiffs allege that as a result, the 
Village will have to be relocated, at a cost estimated to range from $95 to 
$400 million."); see also Appellants' Consented-to Motion for Permission to 
File Overlength Brief at 8, Native Vill. v. Exxonmobil (9th Cir. Mar. 10, 
2010) (No. 09-17490), 2010 WL 1684710 ("Houses and buildings are in 
imminent danger of falling into the sea. Critical infrastructure is threatened 
with permanent destruction. Kivalina must be relocated soon or be abandoned 
and cease to exist.") 
3 Native Village of Kivalina, 663 F. Supp. 2d at 869 ("As Defendants, 
Plaintiffs have named various oil companies, power companies and utility 
providers, all of whom are alleged to be jointly and severally liable for 
causing damage to Plaintiffs. The Complaint does not seek injunctive relief 
nor does it specify a particular amount of monetary damages. However, 
Plaintiffs claim that the effects of global warming mean that they will have to 
relocate the inhabitants of Kivalina at an estimated cost of $95 million to 
$400 million."). 
4 See, e.g., Brief for Appellants' Consented-to Motion for Permission to 
File Overlength Brief at 3, Native Vill. v. Exxonmobil (9th Cir. Mar. 10, 
2010) (No. 09-17490), 2010 WL 1684710 (identifying defendants as "electric 
utilities, oil companies and the nation's largest coal company [who] have 
contributed [to plaintiffs' injuries] by their massive emissions of greenhouse 
gases and production of fossil fuels."). 
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development and exacerbated by greed.5 As such, it was also an unique 
opportunity for the federal courts to assert their role as the branch of 
government through which injured persons may stand up and demand redress 
from those who injure them in connection with matters of national concern, 
regardless of the economic power and influence of the injurers and the 
disfunctionality of a Congress and administration that have failed in their 
duty to protect the public.6 The Court's denial of certiorari leaves in its wake a 
profound sense of disappointment. Rather than take up a complex, 
controversial, cognizable injury, suffered by a uniquely vulnerable victim, the 
federal judiciary chose to display itself as cowed by the magnitude of the 
problem and humbled by the thorniness of its politics.7 This sense of judicial 
                                                             
5 See id. at 3–4 (The plaintiffs claimed that, more than simply producing 
substantial amounts of greenhouse gases, certain of the defendants had 
engineered a massive misinformation campaign about the connection 
between fossil fuels and climate change, and that through this conspiracy "to 
sow doubt about global warming science and create a false 'scientific debate' 
about the causes and consequences of global warming so they could continue 
emitting greenhouse gases," these defendants had contributed significantly to 
the national paralysis over whether to reduce fossil fuel emissions as a means 
of curbing greenhouse gas emissions.). 
6 Apropos to this observation, much of the Kivalina case focused on the 
political question doctrine. See, e.g., Native Village of Kivalina, 663 F. Supp. 
3d at 871–77 (concluding that "by pressing this lawsuit, Plaintiffs are in effect 
asking this Court to make a political judgment . . . . Plaintiffs ignore that the 
allocation of fault—and cost—of global is a matter appropriately left for 
determination by the executive or legislative branch in the first instance."). 
The political question doctrine is not the focus of this Article. 
7 See id. at 875 ("Plaintiffs themselves concede that considerations 
involved in the emission of greenhouse gases and the resulting effects of 
global warming are 'entirely different' than those germane to water or air 
pollution cases. While a water pollution claim typically involves a discrete, 
geographically definable waterway, Plaintiffs' global warming claim is based 
on the emission of greenhouses gases from innumerable sources located 
throughout the world and affecting the entire planet and its atmosphere" 
(references omitted, italics original)). 
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impotence comes from more than the Court's mere denial of certiorari, as the 
Court left intact a Ninth Circuit opinion that called into question the efficacy 
and scope of all federal common law, regardless of the efficacy or scope of 
federal legislation.8 If a topic of national concern is the subject of 
complicated politics that prevent Congress from issuing legislation directly 
addressing it, the Kivalina tale indicates, that topic is too politically hot for 
the judiciary. At the same time, the Kivalina decisions indicate that if a topic 
of national concern is the subject of federal legislation, that topic is likewise 
unsuited for federal common law, regardless of whether the federal 
legislation actually encompasses the injury claimed in a federal common law 
action. For global warming victims, it seems, no circumstance warrants 
federal court relief. 
This Article evaluates the presumptive displacement of federal common 
law where federal legislation addresses the type of harm responsible for 
injuries formerly redressable under common law but fails to provide relief for 
those injuries. Section II reviews the Kivalina case and places it in the context 
of American Electric Power Co. v. Connecticut ("AEP"),9 the 2011 Supreme 
Court decision addressing federal common law in the context of a global 
warming-based public nuisance claim.10 Section III revisits the seminal cases 
most widely cited in displacement analyses, noting the limited scope of some 
of these cases as well as the cogent objections raised by Justices Blackmun 
and Stevens in dissenting opinions in Milwaukee v. Illinois and Middlesex 
County Sewerage Authority v. National Sea Clammers Association.11 
                                                             
8 Native Village of Kivalina, 696 F.3d 849 (9th Cir. 2012) (holding that 
the Clean Air Act displaces federal common law of air pollution). 
9 See generally Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527 
(2011) (rejecting states' public nuisance claims for injunction against 
greenhouse gas emitters on displacement grounds). 
10 Part II, supra note 9 and accompanying text. 
11 Part III, supra note 9; see Milwaukee, 451 U.S. 304, 333 (1980) 
(Blackmun, J., dissenting); see Middlesex, 453 U.S. 1, 22 (1981) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting). 
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Section IV identifies nine "simple truths" about federal common law as 
a preface to a discussion of three distinct approaches to the displacement 
analysis that may be elicited from the cases discussed in Parts II and III.12 
The first approach to displacement analysis is to presumptively displace 
federal common law wherever existing federal legislation could potentially 
address a matter that is also the subject of a federal common law claim. This 
approach rests heavily on the concern that federal common law could 
contradict or otherwise complicate federal regulatory efforts to address 
pollution uniformly, and readily raises separation of powers concerns about 
judicial interference with legislative and executive functions. A second, 
opposing approach to the displacement question is that federal common law 
should presumptively survive federal legislation where federal common law 
has existed on a subject and legislation neither expressly displaces it nor 
directly addressed the injury alleged in subsequent federal common law 
claims. This approach rests on the premise that the fundamental duty of the 
judiciary is to supply relief for injured parties, and courts should be 
disinclined to reject claims on principled grounds where alternative routes 
toward redress are nonexistent or appear hopeless. 
The third approach lies between the first two. It applies a case-by-case 
analysis to the question of whether a federal statute addresses the same 
question as that posed by a federal common law claim, and whether, even if a 
common law claimant's injury will go unaddressed under statutory law, the 
court determines it prudent to allow the legislative-regulatory approach to 
blanket the subject matter. Under this approach, far fewer common law 
actions survive than are displaced, and thus some might characterize it as a 
more circuitous and seemingly thoughtful route to a presumptive 
displacement decision. 
This Article concludes that the Supreme Court, in rejecting the Kivalina 
petition, adheres to the case-by-case approach, complete with its propensity 
to find against assertions of federal common law. The rejection further 
indicates that the presumptive survival position will continue to garner less 
                                                             
12 Part IV, supra note 9 and accompanying text. 
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consideration than it warrants. It is, to say the least, a disheartening 
conclusion. In a country plagued by long-range pollution, congressional 
paralysis and a petrochemical industry dedicated to impeding the 
development of cleaner energy technologies, a renewed acceptance of federal 
common law could address environmental injuries, albeit slowly, inefficiently 
and inconsistently,13 even as the very problems inherent in judicial resolution 
of complex environmental disputes spur the political branches toward more 
effective action on global warming. 
II. THE LOST KIVALINA MOMENT 
If the law truly holds that Kivalina is entitled to no 
compensation under federal law because its federal 
remedy has been displaced by a statute that provides no 
remedy at all, then the answer to this question of 
overriding importance should come from this Court.14 
The Kivalina petition for writ of certiorari offers the Court an 
opportunity to resolve the issue of whether a federal common law claim for 
damages should be subject to the general presumption favoring displacement 
that applies to federal common law claims for injunctive relief.15 As the 
petition notes, a conflict exists among Supreme Court precedents.16 While the 
1981 decision in Middlesex concluded that all federal common law of 
nuisance arising out of a water pollution injury is obliterated by the Clean 
                                                             
13 American Electric Power v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527, 2539 ("The 
expert agency is surely better equipped to do the job that individual district 
judges issuing ad hoc, case-by-case injunctions."). 
14 Brief for Petitioner at 16, Native Vill. v. Exxonmobil Corp., No. 12-
1072 (U.S. Feb. 25, 2013), 2013 WL 794333. 
15 Id. at 2 ("This case presents an opportunity for this Court to resolve a 
conflict in the Court's precedents as to whether a federal common law claim 
for damages is displaced by a regulatory statute like the Clean Air Act."). 
16 Id. (noting the "tension" in the Court's precedents on displacement of 
damages claims). 
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Water Act ("CWA") due to that Act's "comprehensive scope,"17 the 2008 
decision in Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker appears to draw back from the 
presumption that all federal common law addressing a type of pollution is 
swept aside by a federal statute addressing that type of pollution in a manner 
deemed comprehensive.18 In Exxon Shipping, the Court reasoned that private 
claims arising under maritime common law for damages caused by water 
pollution could survive the promulgation of the CWA as long as such claims 
did not interfere with the purpose or operation of the statute.19 According to 
the Kivalina Supreme Court petition, the Court's 2011 opinion in AEP 
adheres to the logic of Exxon Shipping by analyzing the potential for the 
federal common law claim for injunctive relief presented in that case to 
frustrate the operation of the Clean Air Act ("CAA").20 In contrast, the 2012 
Ninth Circuit Kivalina majority opinion applied a more sweeping brand of the 
presumption favoring displacement concluding, without analysis of the 
potential for interference, that the CAA displaced a federal common law 
claim for global warming-related damages.21 As the Ninth Circuit Kivalina 
                                                             
17 Middlesex Cnty. Sewage Auth. v. Nat'l Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 
1, 22 (1981) (citing Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304 (1981)) (for the 
proposition that comprehensive legislation obliterates all federal common 
law). 
18 See generally Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471 (2008) 
(finding that the Clean Water Act does not displace federal common law 
damage claims). 
19 Id. at 498 (concluding that punitive damages for private harms would 
not have "any frustrating effect on the CWA remedial scheme"). 
20 Brief for Petitioner at 12–13, Native Vill. v. Exxonmobil Corp., No. 
12-1072 (U.S. Feb. 25, 2013), 2013 WL 794333 (discussing American Elec. 
Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527 (2011), in which the Court 
concluded that the CAA displaces any federal common law right to seek 
injunctive relief in connection with carbon dioxide emissions). 
21 Native Village of Kivalina, 696 F.3d 849, 856–57 (9th Cir. 2012) 
(discerning no meaningful distinction between a claim seeking damages and 
one seeking an injunction, and therefore concluding that the CAA displaces 
all federal common law claims related to air pollution). 
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concurrence pointed out, there is a conflict in the law of displacement.22 Even 
the majority opinion speculated the Supreme Court might address the issue, 
given the opportunity.23 
A. A CONFLICT LEFT INTACT 
The Supreme Court could, of course, modify the 
Exxon/Middlesex approach to displacement, and 
doubtlessly will have the opportunity to do so.24 
The Supreme Court could have addressed the conflict this term. Instead, 
the Court left the Ninth Circuit decision in Kivalina to serve as the final word 
on displacement for the time being. One interpretation of the Court's inaction 
is that it rejects the idea of distinguishing between claims for damages and 
those for injunctive relief in the law of federal common law displacement, so 
that neither would be presumptively displaced more readily than the other. In 
all displacement cases, under this theory, a court must ask whether a federal 
statute "addresses [the same] question" as that posed by the federal common 
law claim.25 
                                                             
22 Id. at 858 (Pro, J., concurring) ("I write separately to address what I 
view as tension in Supreme Court authority on whether displacement of a 
claim for injunctive relief necessarily calls for displacement of a damages 
claim."); see also id. at 867–69 (Pro, J., concurring) (acknowledging the 
conflict between Middlesex and Exxon Shipping, but ultimately concluding 
that the Kivalina plaintiffs had no standing to bring their claims). 
23 Id. The statement, set forth in the text accompanying note 24, infra, 
can be read as an acknowledgement that the remedies issue warrants Supreme 
Court review. 
24 Id. (determining that "[u]nder Exxon and Middlesex, displacement of a 
federal common law right of action means displacement of remedies. Thus, 
AEP extinguished Kivalina's federal common law public nuisance damage 
action, along with the federal common law public nuisance abatement 
actions."). 
25 AEP, 131 S. Ct. at 2536–37. 
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That oft-cited test, straightforward as it may seem, can lead to very 
different results depending on the degree of focus applied to the "addresses 
the same question" analysis.26 In AEP, for example, the Court concluded that, 
because the CAA empowers the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 
("EPA") to regulate the carbon dioxide emissions generated by the 
defendants, the CAA displaced the plaintiffs' federal common law claims 
seeking an injunction against the defendants that characterized their 
greenhouse gas emissions as unreasonable and tortious.27 By allowing such 
emissions, the Court determined, the EPA already determined the emissions 
are reasonable, and so a court's decision on the common law claim could 
disrupt, contradict, or at least confuse the agency's administration of the 
statute.28 
Under an AEP application of the displacement test, however, the 
Kivalina decision could have come out very differently.29 Certainly the Ninth 
Circuit purported to be following AEP. It dutifully observed that 
displacement is an "issue-specific inquiry" that requires identification of a 
"legislative solution to the particular [issue]" brought in the common law 
                                                             
26 For acknowledgment of this point, see, e.g., Native Village of 
Kivalina, 696 F.3d at 856 ("Although plainly stated, application of the 
[displacement] test can prove complicated. The existence of laws generally 
applicable to the question [at issue in a federal common law claim] is not 
sufficient; the applicability of displacement is an issue-specific inquiry."). 
27 AEP, 131 S. Ct. at 2536–37. 
28 Id. (Under this theory, Exxon Shipping may be distinguished by virtue 
of the fact that the question posed in that case involved the level of care owed 
the public by shipowners, a question arising under maritime law and not 
addressed in the CWA or another environmental statute and thus incapable of 
interfering with the administration of those statutes.); see also Exxon 
Shipping, 554 U.S. at 479–80, 484–89. 
29 Kivalina, 696 F.3d at 856 (acknowledging that "[a]lthough [the 
displacement test may be] plainly stated, application of the test can prove 
complicated."). 
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claim.30 The crux of the Ninth Circuit opinion, however, is its observation 
that "Congress has directly addressed the issue of domestic greenhouse gas 
emissions from stationary sources."31 The court concluded that Congress "has 
therefore displaced federal common law."32 The court, however, never 
considered whether the relief sought in the nuisance action would, if granted, 
disrupt or even overlap with the statute-based regulatory program. Thus the 
court appeared to apply the displacement doctrine in sweeping fashion, 
defining "question at issue" to mean "broad topic," in this case the broad topic 
being emissions of greenhouse gases and their impacts. Even the 
concurrence, which offered a far more detailed and nuanced discussion of 
displacement, ended the discussion with the unembellished conclusion that 
the comprehensive nature of the CAA demonstrates that Congress intended to 
obliterate federal common law actions for damages where emissions cause 
injury.33 Thus, it appears that, to the Ninth Circuit, the "question at issue" is 
"directly addressed" when Congress promulgates a statute deemed 
comprehensive, regardless of whether that statute addresses the precise 
question being posed in a particular common law action. 
B. LITERAL VERSUS BROAD-BRUSH DISPLACEMENT ANALYSIS 
A more literal application of the AEP test leads to the opposite result, as 
the Kivalina plaintiffs were not asking the courts to re-regulate greenhouse 
gas emissions, or even to condemn or recalculate the defendants' EPA-
                                                             
30 Kivalina, 696 F.3d at 856 (quoting Mich. v. U.S. Army Corps of 
Eng'rs, 667 F.3d 765, 777 (7th Cir. 2011)). 
31 Kivalina, 696 F.3d 856 (citing Am. Elec. Power Co., Inc., 131 S. Ct. at 
2530, 2537). 
32 Id. 
33 Kivalina, 696 F.3d at 866 (Pro, J., concurring) (equating the fact that 
Congress included no federal damages remedy in the CAA with a 
congressional choice not to allow federal damages actions against those 
whose emissions cause injury). One could as easily interpret Congress' 
silence on the matter as indicating its intent to allow federal damages actions 
to continue to be brought under common law. 
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sanctioned emissions.34 The Kivalina plaintiffs were claiming that those 
inviolable emissions had caused them compensable injury. Whether a claim 
for compensation calls for a court to address the same question as the CAA 
addresses when it authorizes EPA to set greenhouse gas emission standards is 
                                                             
34 See Native Village of Kivalina, 663 F. Supp. 3d at 876 ("Plaintiffs 
emphasize that because they are not seeking injunctive relief, there is no need 
for the Court to delve into the task of retroactively determining what emission 
limits should have been imposed."); see also Appellants' Consented-to 
Motion for Permission to File Overlength Brief at 24–25, Native Village of 
Kivalina v. Exxonmobil, 663 F. Supp. 2d 863 (2009) (No. 09-17490), 2010 
WL 1684710 ("[T]he central question in a damages case such as this is 
whether it is unreasonable for the defendant to engage in the interference 
without compensating the plaintiff for the harm that the interference has 
caused: In determining whether to award damages, the court's task is to 
decide whether it is unreasonable to engage in the conduct without paying for 
the harm done. Although a general activity may have great utility it may still 
be unreasonable to inflict the harm without compensating for it. The question 
of unreasonableness in a damages action is therefore not one of whether the 
defendant's conduct is reasonable or unreasonable but rather one of who 
should bear the cost of that conduct." (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
TORTS § 821B cmt. I (1979)). See also Connecticut v. American Electric 
Power Co., 582 F.3d 309, 329 (2d Cir. 2009) (rejecting the defendants' 
political question argument) (judgment reversed, American Electric Power 
Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527 (2011)) (Plaintiffs' complaints do not ask 
the district court to decide overarching policy questions such as whether other 
industries or emission sources not before the court must also reduce 
emissions or determine how across-the-board emissions reduction would 
affect the economy and national security. In adjudicating the federal common 
law of nuisance claim pleaded here, the district court will be called upon to 
address and resolve the particular nuisance issue before it, which does not 
involve assessing and balancing the kind of broad interests that a legislature 
or a President might consider in formulating a national emissions policy. The 
question presented here is discrete, focusing on Defendants' alleged public 
nuisance and Plaintiffs' alleged injuries. As the [Plaintiffs] eloquently put it, 
"[t]hat Plaintiffs' injuries are part of a worldwide problem does not mean 
Defendants' contribution to that problem cannot be addressed through 
principled adjudication.). 
J o u r n a l  o f  E n v i r o n m e n t a l  






P a g e  | 236 
 
ISSN 2164-7976 (online) ● DOI 10.5195/pjephl.2014.72 
http://pjephl.law.pitt.edu 
Volume 8 Issue 2 
Spring 2014 
not nearly as clear as the question of whether a claim for an injunction could 
clash with EPA's administration of the CAA, which was the claim before the 
Court in AEP.35 From a practical standpoint, only if the amount of damages 
sought by Kivalina would amount to a de facto enjoinment of the defendants' 
emissions, a conjecture hardly worth entertaining, would Kivalina's claim 
have threatened to interfere with or disrupt the emission allowance question 
addressed by the EPA in implementing the CAA.36 
Additionally, there is nothing in the CAA or the EPA's regulations 
asserting that all harmful emissions shall be eliminated through the statute's 
implementation.37 Air pollution injuries will occur, regardless of the EPA's 
efforts and the CAA's scope. Thus, even if the Court's message in declining to 
hear Kivalina was that the AEP approach applies regardless of the form of 
relief—that is, even if the Court's intent was to reject Kivalina's invitation to 
differentiate categorically between displacement analyses where a plaintiff 
seeks damages and those where a plaintiff seeks an injunction—Kivalina 
nevertheless muddies the law of federal common law displacement. The 
Court left intact a circuit court decision that reverted to the broadest brand of 
displacement, the "topic displacement" presumption of Middlesex, thus 
                                                             
35 See Appellant's Consented-to Motion for Permission to File 
Overlength Brief at 11, Native Village of Kivalina v. Exxonmobil, 663 F. 
Supp. 2d 863 (2009) (No. 09-17490), 2010 WL 1684710 ("A district court 
has authority to issue orders to enforce the CAA's emissions standards or 
order the Administrator to do so and to apply any appropriate civil penalties. 
But neither the citizen-suit provision nor anything else in the CAA or any 
other statute or regulation addresses compensatory damages remedies for 
injuries caused by air pollution." (citations omitted)). 
36 See id. at 80 ("Kivalina only requests monetary relief; it does not ask a 
court to set any emissions standards that could even theoretically conflict 
with any standards that EPA might eventually set under the CAA."). 
37 Kivalina, 663 F. Supp. 2d at 863 (Pro, J., concurring) (The Kivalina 
concurrence quotes the Court in noting that "private claims for economic 
injury do not threaten similar interference with federal regulatory goals."); cf. 
Exxon Shipping, 554 U.S. at 489. 
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implying the Court perceives no distinction between the displacement 
analyses of Middlesex and AEP. 
III. THE FEDERAL COMMON LAW OF FEDERAL COMMON LAW 
To say that Congress "has spoken," is only to begin the 
inquiry; the critical question is what Congress has said.38 
The primary source of federal common law's negative reputation and the 
primary justification for its rejection is a small collection of federal cases. 
These cases and the negative presumptions about federal common law that 
have emerged are worth reexamining in light of the recent surge of public 
nuisance claims arising out of injuries alleged to have been caused by global 
warming, and the ambiguity of the displacement test left in place by the 
Court's declination to hear Kivalina. 
A. BEFORE DISPLACEMENT 
1. ACID RAIN AND THE SCIENCE OF SEWAGE 
At one point, federal common law was not subjected to the current level 
of skepticism. Justice Holmes' pithy 1907 opinion in Georgia v. Tennessee 
Copper Co. sets forth the premises that the law of nuisance applies where a 
private party's air pollution causes environmental harm, that equitable relief is 
likely the appropriate form of relief when an action is brought by a state in its 
quasi-sovereign capacity, and that a federal court possesses the capacity to 
craft common law under such circumstances.39 A year earlier, however, 
                                                             
38 Milwaukee, 451 U.S. at 339 n.8 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (references 
omitted). 
39 Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 239–40 (1907) (The case 
involved a private party defendant whose operations in Tennessee generated 
sulphurous acid emissions, which fell over large tracts of Georgia as acid 
rain, causing wholesale destruction of crops, orchids, forests, and threatening 
the public health. The primary focus of the opinion is its finding that states 
maintain quasi-sovereign status, rendering more appropriate an action in 
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Justice Holmes voiced caution over the exercise of federal common law in 
Missouri v. Illinois.40 In that case, the Court observed, firstly, that in common 
law-based actions involving states as parties, while the federal courts 
maintain constitutionally-grounded original jurisdiction, the courts' authority 
would not override federal legislation.41 The Court also cautioned that it 
should apply federal common law sparingly, only in cases "of serious 
magnitude, clearly and fully proved, and [where] the principle to be applied 
[is] one which the court is prepared deliberately to maintain against all 
considerations on the other side."42 Of direct pertinence in evaluating the 
Court's current decision against hearing Kivalina, Justice Holmes' tone of 
elevated circumspection in Missouri is based in large part on his appreciation 
of the complex and evolving nature of the factual analysis involved in a case 
grounded upon allegations of long-range water pollution and its connection 
with an alleged spike in deaths and illnesses due to typhoid fever.43 Georgia, 
                                                                                                                              
equity than might have been the case had the plaintiff been a private party. 
Justice Harlan, concurring, opined that a private party's plea for injunctive 
relief should be treated identically to that brought by a state.). 
40 See generally Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 496 (1906) (rejecting 
Missouri's contention that sewage discharged from Chicago was responsible 
for a spike in deaths from typhoid fever among Missouri citizens). 
41 Id. at 519 ("[I]f one state raises a controversy with another, this court 
must determine whether there is any principle of law, and if any, what, on 
which the plaintiff can recover. But the fact that this court must decide does 
not mean, of course, that it takes the place of a legislature."). 
42 Id. at 521 (going on to explain that "[a]s to the principle to be laid 
down, the caution necessary is manifest," because federal common law 
precedents arising out of disputes involving states may be utilized by other 
states against one another in the manner of state court precedents between 
private citizens, perhaps with more resounding and unanticipated results). 
43 Id. at 522–24 (discussing the contradictory scientific evidence 
presented by the litigants). Later cases affirm the Court's concern about the 
difficulties of sorting environmental evidence. See, e.g., New York v. New 
Jersey, 256 U.S. 296 (1921) (concluding, in a public nuisance action for an 
enjoinment of sewage discharges, that conflicting evidence rendered it 
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nevertheless, stands for the proposition that where causation is established, 
federal common law is an appropriate vehicle for redressing transboundary 
environmental injuries.44 
2. ERIE, OVERBLOWN 
It is well settled that a body of federal common law has 
survived the decision in Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins. Erie 
made clear that federal courts, as courts of limited 
jurisdiction, lack general power to formulate and impose 
their own rules of decision. The Court, however, did not 
there upset, nor has it since disturbed, a deeply rooted, 
more specialized federal common law that has arisen to 
effectuate federal interests embodied either in the 
Constitution or an Act of Congress. Chief among the 
federal interests served by this common law are the 
resolution of interstate disputes and the implementation 
of national statutory or regulatory policies.45 
The case most renowned for declaring federal common law 
unconstitutional is Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins.46 Indeed, the Ninth Circuit 
                                                                                                                              
impossible for the Court to determine whether New Jersey sewage was 
polluting New York waters). 
44 See generally Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 237 U.S. 474 (1915) 
(although standing for the acknowledgment of the appropriateness of federal 
common law in interstate pollution cases, is also an example of how ungainly 
interstate pollution cases can be). See also Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 
240 U.S. 650 (1916) (final decree setting forth a specific, multi-faceted 
injunction requirement diminished emissions, recordkeeping, inspections and 
compensation for inspectors to be deposited with the clerk of courts). 
45 Milwaukee, 451 U.S. at 334–35 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (references 
and footnote omitted). 
46 See generally Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) 
(eviscerating Swift v. Tyson, 16 Pet. 1 (1842), for its recognition of local and 
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Kivalina opinion lauds Erie for its "announced extinction of federal general 
common law."47 Certainly that characterization bears support, as the crux of 
the Erie opinion is the Court's pronouncement that "[e]xcept in matters 
governed by the Federal Constitution or by acts of Congress, the law to be 
applied in any case is the law of the state. . . . There is no federal general 
common law."48 The broad rejection of federal common law often attributed 
to Erie, however, ignores the case background, both factual and precedential, 
as well as a companion case issued on the same day. 
The dispute in Erie arose when a man walking along a train track in 
Pennsylvania was struck by a protrusion from a passing train.49 Seeking to 
avoid the common law of Pennsylvania, under which persons walking 
alongside train tracks were deemed trespassers and thus subject to a 
diminished duty of care, the injured party brought the action in federal court 
in New York, where the railroad company was incorporated.50 No New York 
precedent contradicted the injured man's argument that his use of a well-worn 
footpath running alongside the tracks allowed him to claim the protections 
due a licensee. Thus, the issue before the Court was whether federal courts 
hearing diversity actions had the power to fashion common law or needed to 
apply the common law as developed in the court of the state where the injury 
had occurred. Although the discussion in the Court's opinion does not 
emphatically confine itself to diversity actions, a fair interpretation is that the 
                                                                                                                              
general categories of common law and its recognition that federal courts had 
the authority to develop general common law). 
47 Native Village of Kivalina, 696 F.3d at 855 (The Kivalina opinion 
observes that, subsequent to Erie, the Supreme Court has gone on to 
"articulate a 'keener understanding' of the actual contours of federal common 
law" (citing AEP, 131 S. Ct. at 2535)). 
48 Erie at 78 (The Court goes on to deny any caveats to its 
pronouncement, observing that whether the state law is statutory or common 
law, or local or general in nature, the Constitution grants the federal courts no 
power to declare substantive rules of common law.). 
49 Id. at 69–70. 
50 Id. 
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case addresses only those actions, and only where federal common law could 
conflict with existing, applicable state common law. 
A second key element of Erie, perhaps more significant than it being a 
diversity action, is that up until Erie, courts differentiated between "general" 
and "local" common law.51 Indeed, the primary discussion in the opinion is 
about the problems caused by that distinction and the Court's disapproval of 
Swift v. Tyson, the case credited with creating the general-local distinction.52 
Thus, although some sentences of the Erie opinion address federal common 
law quite broadly, the limitation in what might seem to read as a sweeping 
condemnation of all federal common law is the word "general," which reads 
as a descriptive adjective but was actually a legal term of art.53 Erie 
eliminated the court-spawned idea that certain nationwide activities warranted 
the development of federal common law, regardless of the fact that common 
law on the matter had been developed in the courts of the state that was the 
locus of the injury. Thus, it was an important decision, but in no way a 
wholesale condemnation of federal common law. 
3. ERIE'S OVERSHADOWED COMPANION CASE 
Underscoring the premise that the so-called Erie doctrine cannot be 
divorced from its context is the decision in Hinderlider v. La Plata Co., 
decided by the Court on the same day as Erie and likewise written by Justice 
Brandeis.54 Hinderlider involved a water rights dispute between a Colorado 
corporation and the state of Colorado. Colorado, operating under a compact 
between itself and New Mexico, administered the water of the La Plata River 
                                                             
51 Id. at 74–75 (criticizing the recognition of "general common law" as 
having had the effect of undermining state law). 
52 Id. at 69 (the Court launches its opinion with: "The question for 
decision is whether the oft-challenged doctrine of Swift v. Tyson shall now be 
disapproved."). 
53 Id. at 70–71 (Both the trial court and the Second Circuit had held that 
the question was "not of local, but of general, law."). 
54 Hinderlider v. La Plata Co., 304 U.S. 92 (1938). 
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in a manner the plaintiff claimed prevented it from using the river's water for 
irrigation. The case differed from Erie in that it was not a diversity action.55 
As a dispute over rights to an interstate waterway and the validity of a two-
state compact, Hinderlider presented a federal question.56 While criticizing 
the Colorado court's decision that had preceded its own review, the Court 
stated that 
whether the water of an interstate stream must be 
apportioned between the two States is a question of 
"federal common law" upon which neither the statutes 
nor the decisions of either State can be conclusive. 
Jurisdiction over controversies concerning rights in 
interstate streams is no different than those concerning 
boundaries. These have been recognized as presenting 
federal questions.57 
Justice Brandeis' words in Hinderlider make it clear he did not intend his 
simultaneously published opinion in Erie to be read as advocating for the 
evisceration of all federal common law. 
B. A PRESUMPTIVE SYMBIOSIS BETWEEN FEDERAL 
STATUTORY AND COMMON LAW 
1. BEFORE THE CLEAN WATER ACT 
During the 1970s and thus concurrently with Congress' promulgation of 
the current slate of major federal environmental statutes, the Court addressed 
the issue of federal common law in connection with interstate water pollution 
in three high-profile opinions. The first, Illinois v. Milwaukee, was a public 
nuisance suit pleading for the abatement of sewage discharges by Milwaukee 
                                                             
55 See Hinderlider, 304 U.S. at 100. 
56 Id. at 101–04 (going on to address the issue of apportionment of water 
flowing in interstate streams as well as the constitutionality of multi-state 
compacts borne of negotiated compromise). 
57 Id. at 110. 
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into Lake Michigan, an interstate water body with both Wisconsin and 
Illinois shorelines.58 In considering the question of its jurisdiction over the 
matter, the Court professed to a long-held "philosophy that 'our original 
jurisdiction should be invoked sparingly'" before going on to attribute the 
Court's decision on whether to invoke its jurisdiction to considerations such 
as "the seriousness and dignity of the claim" as well as the availability of 
another forum.59 On the question of statutory jurisdiction, the Court 
concluded that Title 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a)'s reference to civil actions arising 
"under the . . . laws . . . of the United States" authorized original jurisdiction 
in federal district courts for claims founded on federal common law. The 
Court reasoned that the word "law" is not meant to encompass only statutory 
law in discussions of either state or federal jurisdiction, but includes common 
law as well.60 The Court then quoted the Tenth Circuit case of Texas v. 
Pankey to make the point that "the ecological rights of a State" are 
particularly appropriate for federal common law resolution.61 
Pankey arose out of a dispute between New Mexico ranch owners and 
the state of Texas, which complained that chemical pesticides used by the 
ranchers flowed via the Canadian River across the border into Texas, where 
they threatened a major water supply. The issue before the Tenth Circuit was 
whether the Supreme Court's Constitution-based original jurisdiction over 
cases in which a state is a party is exclusive. Concluding that such cases may 
                                                             
58 See Illinois v. Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972) (alleging that "200 
million gallons of raw or inadequately treated sewage and other waste 
materials are discharged daily into the lake in the Milwaukee area alone." Id. 
at 93.). 
59 Id. (citing Utah v. United States, 394 U.S. 89 (1969)). 
60 See id. at 98–100. The Court summed up its analysis on the meaning 
of the term "law" in the context of federal jurisdiction with: "We see no 
reason not to give 'laws' its natural meaning, and therefore conclude that 
§ 1331 jurisdiction will support claims founded upon federal common law as 
well as those of a statutory origin." Id. at 100 (citation omitted). 
61 Id. at 99–100 (citing Texas v. Pankey, 441 F.2d 236, 240 (10th Cir. 
1971)). 
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be heard in federal district court, the court also noted the appropriateness of 
federal common law as a means of vindicating a state's environmental rights. 
The Illinois Court relied heavily on Pankey to reach the same conclusions.62 
Illinois preceded the passage of the 1972 CWA and thus may be 
misconstrued as no longer relevant in its discussion of federal common law 
jurisdiction. As Justice Douglas' opinion observes, however, a number of 
federal statutes, including the precursor to the current CWA itself, addressed 
water pollution in the years leading up to 1972.63 Thus Illinois considered the 
applicability of federal common law to water pollution against the backdrop 
of a federal regulatory regime addressing that broad concern.64 Federal 
common law did not interfere with federal statutory law, according to the 
Court, where "[t]he remedy sought . . . is not within the precise scope of 
                                                             
62 The Court's quotation from Texas v. Pankey reads in full, 
As the field of federal common law has been given necessary 
expansion into matters of federal concern and relationship 
(where no applicable federal statute exists, as there does not 
here), the ecological rights of a State in the improper 
impairment of them from sources outside the State's own 
territory, now would and should, we think, be held to be a 
matter having basis and standard in federal common law and so 
directly constituting a question arising under the laws of the 
United States. 
Pankey, 441 F.2d at 240. 
63 The formal title of the CWA is the Federal Water Pollution Control 
Act Amendments. Its precursor was the Federal Water Pollution Control Act. 
33 U.S.C. §§ 1151–1165 (1948) (current version at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387 
(2012)). 
64 Other federal statutes directly addressing or encompassing water 
pollution and cited by the Court included the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, 
33 U.S.C. § 407 (2012); the National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 4321–4347 (2012); the Fish and Wildlife Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 742a–742j 
(2012); and the Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 661–667e 
(2012). See Illinois, 406 U.S. at 102. 
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remedies prescribed by Congress."65 Thus, the Illinois Court did not presume 
that federal legislation on an environmental topic evidenced a congressional 
intent to obliterate all federal common law on that topic. Indeed, the Court 
indicated that the presumption should be the opposite—that is, federal 
common law presumptively coexists with federal statutory law—in the 
environmental arena. "When we deal with air and water in their ambient or 
interstate aspects, there is federal common law," the opinion states 
unambiguously, before characterizing the relationship in a manner that might 
be termed symbiotic: "[w]hile the various federal environmental protection 
statutes will not necessarily mark the outer bounds of the federal common 
law, they may provide useful guidelines in fashioning such rules of 
decision."66 
The Illinois Court also observed that a federal statutory regime could 
very well displace federal common law, somewhat blunting these promising 
assertions on the scope and durability of federal court jurisdiction and 
common law.67 Even as it made this statement, however, the Court affirmed 
its view on the appropriateness of federal common law, more so than state 
common law, for addressing interstate environmental matters.68 Again 
quoting Texas v. Pankey, the Court stated: 
                                                             
65 Illinois, 406 U.S. at 103 (noting further that "the remedies which 
Congress provides are not necessarily the only federal remedies available." 
Id.). 
66 Id. at 103 n.5. 
67 Id. at 107–08 ("It may happen that new federal laws and new federal 
regulations may in time pre-empt the field of federal common law of 
nuisance"); see also id. at 107–08 n.9 ("Until the field has been made the 
subject of comprehensive legislation or authorized administrative standards, 
only a federal common law basis can provide an adequate means for dealing 
with such claims as alleged federal rights." (quoting Texas v. Pankey, 441 
F.2d 236, 241–42 (10th Cir. 1971)). 
68 Id. (noting that federal courts should consider state standards as 
"relevant"). 
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Federal common law and not the varying common law of 
the individual States is, we think, entitled and necessary 
to be recognized as a basis for dealing in uniform 
standard with the environmental rights of a State against 
improper impairment by sources outside its domain. The 
more would this seem to be imperative in the present era 
of growing concern on the part of a State about its 
ecological conditions and impairments of them.69 
2. TWO POWERFUL DISSENTS 
After asserting its original jurisdiction and its discretion on whether to 
exercise it over matters involving interstate pollution, the Illinois Court 
ultimately remitted the case to the federal district court.70 Nine years later the 
case reached the Supreme Court again, where the Court determined that the 
CWA displaced all federal common law addressing water pollution. 
A. JUSTICE BLACKMUN'S MILWAUKEE DISSENT 
In Milwaukee v. Illinois, the Court faced a situation that was at the same 
time similar and very different from that which it faced nine years earlier.71 
The similarity was the fact that the state of Illinois still sought relief from 
Milwaukee's inadequate sewage treatment. The environmental rights of the 
state had not been vindicated for a decade. As a matter to be resolved through 
federal common law, however, the situation was almost diametrically 
opposed to that which Justice Douglas had confronted in 1972. Over the 
course of the nine-year interim, the federal district court had addressed the 
case. Finding the sewage discharges in question to constitute a nuisance as a 
matter of federal common law, the district court produced a plan through 
                                                             
69 Id. at 107–08 n.9. 
70 Id. at 108. 
71 Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 309–10 (1981). 
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which Milwaukee was to address its inadequate sewage treatment practices.72 
Concurrently, the Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources, operating 
under the CWA-authorized supervision of EPA, had both issued CWA 
permits to the sewage treatment facility and obtained, through the Wisconsin 
state court, a judgment establishing a timetable for a plan to control sewage 
overflows.73 The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals had upheld the 
applicability of federal common law, but had reversed the part of the district 
court's order mandating effluent treatment standards more stringent than those 
required under the CWA.74 
The Supreme Court went further, determining that the CWA had 
displaced federal common law on interstate water pollution. After criticizing 
federal common law as being comprised of "often vague and indeterminate 
nuisance concepts and maxims of equity jurisprudence," the Court went on to 
characterize its approach to the federal common law question as "start[ing] 
with the assumption that it is for Congress, not federal courts, to articulate the 
appropriate standards to be applied as a matter of federal law."75 
On the basis of such statements, Milwaukee could be interpreted as 
mandating the presumptive eradication of any and all federal common law 
                                                             
72 Id. at 311–12 (In two separate orders, the district court ordered 
Milwaukee to eliminate overflows, achieve specific effluent limitations for 
treated sewage, and adhere to a timetable for the construction of a system to 
eliminate sewage overflows.). 
73 Id. at 310–11. 
74 Id. at 312 (quoting the Court of Appeals as having determined that 
"[i]n applying the federal common law of nuisance in a water pollution case, 
a court should not ignore the Act but should look to its policies and principles 
for guidance"). 
75 Id. at 316–17 ("Congress has not left the formulation of appropriate 
federal standards to the courts through application of often vague and 
indeterminate nuisance concepts and maxims of equity jurisprudence, but 
rather has occupied the field through the establishment of a comprehensive 
regulatory program supervised by an expert administrative agency."). 
J o u r n a l  o f  E n v i r o n m e n t a l  






P a g e  | 248 
 
ISSN 2164-7976 (online) ● DOI 10.5195/pjephl.2014.72 
http://pjephl.law.pitt.edu 
Volume 8 Issue 2 
Spring 2014 
touching on an area of social concern in the face of a federal statute 
addressing the same broad topic, regardless of whether the statute addressed 
the injury that federal common law had addressed. Certain elements of the 
case, however, recommend another interpretation. First, factually the Court 
was faced with two plans to correct Milwaukee's sewage problem, one based 
on federal common law and the other imposed by a state court at the behest of 
the agency charged with implementing the federal statute. The federal 
common law and statute-based plans addressed the very same problem, 
rendering the federal common law plan at best superfluous and quite possibly 
contradictory to the statute-based plan, under either a broad or close 
displacement analysis.76 Another sign that Milwaukee should not be read as 
endorsing a broad presumptive displacement doctrine comes early in the 
opinion, where, when discussing a precedent, the Court characterized the 
displacement analysis as answering "whether the legislative scheme 'spoke 
directly to a question'—in that case the question of damages . . . ."77 This 
language supports a displacement analysis that focuses on whether federal 
statutory law provides redress in place of common law, rather than simply 
whether a statute covers the same subject area formerly covered by federal 
common law. It also displays that sensitivity to the form of relief requested is 
appropriate in displacement analysis. 
In addition to the above, although the amount of detail the Milwaukee 
Court offered to prove that the CWA was intended to supplant federal 
                                                             
76 Id. at 320–24 (detailing the regulatory plan to control discharges and 
refusing to interfere with that plan. "There is no 'interstice' here to be filled by 
federal common law: overflows are covered by the Act and have been 
addressed by the regulatory regime established by the Act. Although a federal 
court may disagree with the regulatory approach taken by the agency with 
responsibility for issuing permits under the Act, such disagreement alone is 
no basis for the creation of federal common law." Id.). 
77 Milwaukee, 451 U.S. at 315 (discussing Mobil Oil Corp. v. 
Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 618 (1978), in which the Court determined that the 
Death on the High Seas Act, in addressing damages but not every issue of 
wrongful-death law, nevertheless displaced the general maritime law on the 
issue of damages for loss of society). 
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common law could be interpreted as mere thoroughness, it also may 
demonstrate the level of analysis the Court considered warranted in 
displacement determinations. For example, in comparing the current CWA 
with the water pollution control act in existence when the Court decided 
Illinois, the Milwaukee Court observed that Congress had characterized the 
prior law as "inadequate in every vital aspect."78 Next, the Court embarked on 
a lengthy discussion of the current CWA's comprehensive nature, including 
the universal applicability of the CWA permit requirement, the rigor of the 
effluent discharge and overflow control programs, and the statute-based 
opportunities for states to participate in permitting processes taking place in 
neighboring states.79 These passages indicate that the Court intended that 
displacement only be found at the conclusion of a close analysis of whether 
the statute in question addresses the injury—not simply the subject matter—
formerly addressed under federal common law. 
Working against this generous reading of Milwaukee, however, is the 
Court's treatment of a savings provision of the CWA that preserves "any right 
which any person may have under any statute or common law . . . to seek any 
other relief . . . ."80 The Court seized on the fact that the provision's 
applicability is limited to the statute's citizen suit section, concluding from 
this that the provision "cannot be read to mean that the Act as a whole does 
not supplant formerly available federal common-law actions."81 This strained 
reading of the statute's savings clause, coupled with the Court's initial 
statements about the tenuous position of federal common law in the 
constitutional scheme, indicates that the Milwaukee Court's ultimate goal was 
                                                             
78 Id. at 318. 
79 Id. at 317–27 (reviewing congressional intent to create a 
comprehensive scheme and its success in doing so). 
80 Id. at 328 (quoting CWA § 505(e); 33 U.S.C. § 1365). 
81 Id. at 329 (finding the notion "unlikely" that the reference to common 
law in § 505(e) was meant to include federal common law). 
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to drive federal common law out of the courts where a statute justifies such a 
retreat, even where such justification is based on meager logic.82 
In dissent, Justice Blackmun addressed the key issue arising in 
displacement analyses, that of how presumptively federal statutory law 
should supplant federal common law where the two address various aspects 
of a single broad topic.83 Justice Blackmun's opening salve was both concise 
and pointed. 
In contrasting congressional displacement of the 
common law with federal pre-emption of state law, the 
Court assumes that as soon as Congress "addresses a 
question previously governed" by federal common law, 
"the need for such an unusual exercise of lawmaking by 
federal courts disappears." This "automatic 
displacement" approach is inadequate in two respects. It 
fails to reflect the unique role of federal common law 
plays in resolving disputes between one State and the 
citizens or government of another. In addition, it ignores 
this Court's frequent recognition that federal common 
law may complement congressional action in the 
fulfillment of federal policies.84 
Justice Blackmun debated both the Court's result-oriented reading of the 
CWA savings provisions and its equally dubious determination that 
congressional statements about the comprehensive nature of the CWA 
conclusively signal a legislative intent to obliterate all federal common law 
addressing water pollution.85 
                                                             
82 Id. at 315 (identifying displacement of federal common law as based 
on the principle of separation of powers). 
83 Milwaukee, 451 U.S. at 333–34. 
84 Id. (citation and footnote omitted). 
85 Id. at 339–42 (explaining that CWA § 505(e)'s "in this section" 
language could more naturally be read as Congress' intent that none of the 
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Perhaps the most powerful passage in Justice Blackmun's dissent, 
however, was his argument for the utility of federal common law as a 
complement to federal statutory law and an appropriate vehicle through 
which to address interstate disputes where the nation has an interest in 
decisional uniformity.86 Justice Blackmun pointed out that federal common 
law is appropriate where the interstate nature of a controversy renders 
inappropriate the law of either state.87 It is appropriate, Justice Blackmun 
observed, to aid states to protect against unreasonable interference in their 
natural environment and resources causes by other states or their citizens.88 
Federal common law also applies, Justice Blackmun noted, where common 
law must "fill the interstices of a pervasively federal framework."89 Finally, 
Justice Blackmun argued that federal common law is appropriate where a 
                                                                                                                              
procedural and jurisdictional limitations imposed upon plaintiffs who chose 
to sue under the citizen-suit provisions of the CWA should be imposed upon 
those suing under pre-existing causes of action such as common law. In 
connection with section 505(e), Justice Blackmun also disputes the Court's 
assertion that the reference to "any . . . common law" should be read as a 
reference to state common law only. Id. at 340). See also id. at 342–43 
(Blackmun discusses congressional intent in producing a comprehensive 
statute, pointing out that "[t]he fact that legislators may characterize their 
efforts as more 'comprehensive' than prior legislation hardly prevents them 
from authorizing the continued existence of supplemental legal and equitable 
solutions to the broad and serious problem addressed."). 
86 Id. at 334–38. 
87 Id. at 335 (pointing out that where interstate disputes arise, "it is clear 
under our federal system that laws of one State cannot impose upon the 
sovereign rights and interests of another"). 
88 Id. at 335 (citing to Georgia, Missouri, and Illinois, among other 
Supreme Court decisions ranging from 1907 through 1972). 
89 Milwaukee, 451 U.S. at 336 (pointing out that where the federal 
interest is sufficiently strong, courts may rely on federal common law to settle 
disputes where the federal statute or the Constitution fail to provide a precise 
answer). 
J o u r n a l  o f  E n v i r o n m e n t a l  






P a g e  | 252 
 
ISSN 2164-7976 (online) ● DOI 10.5195/pjephl.2014.72 
http://pjephl.law.pitt.edu 
Volume 8 Issue 2 
Spring 2014 
federal interest in uniformity presides.90 Interstate pollution, he concluded, is 
such an area.91 
B. JUSTICE STEVENS' MIDDLESEX DISSENT 
Justice Blackmun's defense of federal common law was echoed, only 
months later, by Justice Stevens in his dissenting opinion in Middlesex.92 The 
case involved claims for injunctive relief as well as compensatory and 
punitive damages brought in federal district court in New Jersey by fishermen 
and shell-fishermen who averred that sewage emanating from New York, 
New Jersey, and maritime vessels had polluted the Atlantic Ocean off the east 
coast to the extent that it threatened the fishing, clamming and lobster 
industries operating in those waters.93 Along with multiple statute-based 
claims, the plaintiffs presented claims based on the federal common law of 
nuisance.94 The Court concluded, without analysis, that the CWA had fully 
displaced the federal common law of nuisance.95 Tellingly, the Court's 
                                                             
90 Id. at 336–37. 
91 Id. (arguing that in Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 101–03 
(1972), the Court held that "the abiding federal interest in the purity of 
interstate waters justified application of federal common law."). 
92 Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. Nat'l Sea Clammers Ass'n, 
453 U.S. 1, 22 (1981). 
93 Id. at 4–5 (The plaintiffs linked the sewage discharge to a massive 
algal bloom that, once dead, created an oxygen deficiency near the ocean 
floor where it settled, thereby killing shellfish, other ocean-bottom dwellers 
and other marine life.). 
94 Id. at 4–8 (detailing claims based on the Federal Water Pollution 
Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387 (1972) (amended 1977), and the 
Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1401–1445 
(1972)). 
95 Id. at 21 n.17 (The Court thereby deflected the question of whether a 
private party could ever claim damages under the federal common law of 
nuisance.). See also id. at 21–22 (characterizing Milwaukee as holding that 
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separate statutory discussion focused on whether the CWA or the Marine 
Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act ("MPRSA") authorizes a private 
right of action, concluding that neither Act does. That is, the Court displaced 
federal common law in an opinion expressly acknowledging that the 
displacing statute does not supply private citizens with an alternative means 
of seeking the relief they might have obtained under federal common law. 
Thus, the Middlesex Court utilized the crudest form of the displacement 
analysis, considering only whether a federal statute addresses a broad topic—
here, water pollution—to conclude that all federal common law on that broad 
topic has been summarily extinguished, regardless of the availability of relief 
under the administrative scheme. 
Another instructive element of Middlesex is that the plaintiffs contended 
that the federal administrators whose duty it was to administer the statutes in 
play were allowing the two states to discharge in excess of amounts allowed 
by the two federal statutes.96 Noting that the statutes provide processes 
through which citizens may seek judicial review against agencies for 
dereliction of their statutory duties, the Court concluded that such avenues 
were an injured party's sole legal recourse.97 The Court also rejected the 
argument, which it raised sua sponte, that the defendants could bring suit 
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which authorizes suits claiming violations of federal 
statutes by state officials. The Court concluded that a federal statute's 
provision of "sufficiently comprehensive" remedial devices demonstrates a 
congressional intent to preclude suit under section 1983.98 In sum, according 
to Middlesex, a party injured by pollution where discharges breach a federal 
statute has no judicial recourse against the polluter and no means of 
                                                                                                                              
"the federal common law of nuisance in the area of water pollution is entirely 
pre-empted by the more comprehensive scope of the [Federal Water Pollution 
Control Act], which was completely revised soon after the decision in Illinois 
v. Milwaukee."). 
96 Middlesex, 453 U.S. at 12. 
97 Id. at 13–15 (Defendants had missed statutory deadlines for such suits, 
and thus had no recourse against the agencies.). 
98 Id. at 19–20. 
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collecting compensation for the injury. The party's only recourse under 
federal law is to beg the administering agency to protect it against future 
injury. Without ambiguity, in this instance the Court did not apply a brand of 
displacement analysis that included inquiry into whether a federal statute 
addresses the actual issue, or remedy, that is the focus of a federal common 
law claim. 
Justice Stevens thus had much from which to dissent. First, Justice 
Stevens parsed statutory language and dredged legislative histories to reach 
conclusions opposed to the Court's about Congress' intent to displace federal 
common law in promulgating the CWA.99 "Despite their comprehensive 
enforcement mechanisms, both statutes expressly preserve all legal remedies 
otherwise available," Justice Stevens pointed out, then quoted from the 
Senate Report on the CWA as evidence that legislators had intended that 
"[c]ompliance with requirements under this Act would not be a defense to a 
common law action for pollution damage."100 Perhaps the most powerful 
element of Justice Stevens' dissent, however, is the simple logic he employed 
to question the Court's aggressive campaign against federal common law. 
"When should a person injured by a violation of federal law be allowed to 
recover his damages in a federal court?" he queried at the outset of his 
opinion.101 "[R]ules are meant to be obeyed, and those who violate them 
should be held responsible for their misdeeds," he went on, as if feeling his 
way along a sequence of successive intrinsic truths.102 "Since the earliest days 
                                                             
99 Id. at 29–31. 
100 Id. at 29; see also id. at 32. 
101 Id. at 22 (characterizing the question as "seemingly simple" and 
"more difficult than most substantive questions that come before [the 
Court]"). 
102 Middlesex, 453 U.S. at 24 (noting that for most of the court's history, 
conservative justices considered it appropriate to allow private parties injured 
through the violation of a statute enacted to protect the interests of the private 
parties to seek relief in the courts). 
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of the common law, it has been the business of courts to fashion remedies for 
wrongs."103 
After debunking the Court's analysis and its apparent priorities, Justice 
Stevens attributed the Court's increasingly contrived roadblocks to federal 
court access to its "concern[ ] about the burdens imposed upon the federal 
judiciary, the quality of the work product of Congress, and the sheer bulk of 
new federal legislation . . . ."104 These valid, pragmatic yet unprincipled 
concerns, Justice Stevens worried, had prompted the courts to fashion 
displacement formulas aimed at compromising "the simple common-law 
presumption" of court access for the injured citizen.105 "The touchstone now 
is congressional intent," Justice Stevens noted, identifying the latest judge-
fabricated rationale to "further restrict the availability of private remedies."106 
In considering the situation before the Middlesex Court, Justice Stevens 
concluded his critique of the Court's resolve to banish federal common law 
from the dockets with the observation that 
apart from these two statutes, the dumping operations of 
petitioners would constitute a common-law nuisance for 
which respondents would have a federal remedy. The net 
effect of the Court's analysis of the legislative intent is 
therefore a conclusion that Congress, by enacting the 
Clean Water Act and the MPRSA, deliberately deprived 
respondents of effective federal remedies that would 
otherwise have been available to them. In my judgment, 
the language of both statutes, as well as their legislative 
history, belies this improbable conclusion.107 
Near the end of his Middlesex dissent, Justice Stevens observed that 
                                                             
103 Id. at 24. 
104 Id. at 24–25. 
105 Id. 
106 Id. 
107 Middlesex, 453 U.S. at 27. 
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[t]he effect of the Court's holding in Milwaukee [] was to 
make the city of Milwaukee's compliance with the 
requirements of the Clean Water Act a complete defense 
to a federal common-law nuisance action for pollution 
damage. . . . Today, the Court pursues the pre-emption 
rationale of Milwaukee [] to its inexorable conclusion 
and holds that even noncompliance with the 
requirements of the Clean Water Act and the MPRSA is 
a defense to a federal common-law nuisance claim.108 
In so stating, Justice Stevens underscored the perversity of the 
displacement doctrine as it had evolved to that point. 
 While declaring the federal common law of nuisance fully 
displaced by the CWA and the MPRSA, and thus vacating and remanding the 
portion of the lower court opinion stating otherwise, the Supreme Court 
expressly declined to address the lower court's determination that a private 
plaintiff's federal common law nuisance suit seeking damages survived the 
promulgation of the federal statutes.109 Thus, even Middlesex offers some 
indication that displacement analysis warrants some level of nuance. 
C. ENVIRONMENTAL FEDERAL COMMON LAW AFTER 2000 
1. EXXON SHIPPING—OUTLIER OR FAITHFUL 
APPLICATION OF MILWAUKEE? 
[T]his case differs from . . . Middlesex and Milwaukee, 
where plaintiffs' common law nuisance claims amounted 
                                                             
108 Id. at 31. 
109 Id. at 11 n.17 ("We therefore need not discuss the question whether 
the federal common law of nuisance could ever be the basis of a suit for 
damages by a private party."). 
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to arguments for effluent-discharge standards different 
from those provided by the CWA.110 
In 2008, the Court added another disappointing chapter to the Exxon 
Valdez saga with its decision in Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker. There, the 
Court slashed a jury's punitive damage award through application of its newly 
minted 1:1 ratio for compensatory and punitive damages.111 This decision 
crafted federal common law through its opinion somewhat alleviated the 
growing sense that the federal environmental legislative regime had rendered 
federal common law extinct in environmental matters. 
The Exxon Shipping opinion focused largely on the history and unique 
nature of punitive damages; in addition, the case involved maritime law.112 
                                                             
110 Exxon Shipping v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 489 n.7 (2008) (perceiving a 
clear distinction between claims for economic injury that do and do not 
threaten interference with a federal regulatory scheme). 
111 Exxon Shipping, 554 U.S. 471. See also In re the Exxon Valdez, 296 
F. Supp. 2d 1071 (D. Alaska 2004), vacated and remanded sub nom. In re 
Exxon Valdez, 472 F.3d 600 (9th Cir. 2006), opinion amended and 
superseded on denial of reh'g, 490 F.3d 1066 (9th Cir. 2007), vacated sub 
nom. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471 (2008), and vacated sub 
nom. In re Exxon Valdez, 490 F.3d 1066 (9th Cir. 2007), vacated sub nom. 
Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471 (2008) (where Exxon's 1989 
grounding of an oil supertanker in Alaska resulted in a district court decision 
of a $4.5 billion award in punitive damages); see also In re Exxon Valdez, 
490 F.3d 1066 (9th Cir. 2007), vacated sub nom. Exxon Shipping Co. v. 
Baker, 554 U.S. 471 (2008) (where the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals 
vacated and remanded for a reduction of the punitive damages to $2.5 billion. 
The Supreme Court devised a 1:1 formula for determining punitive damages 
based on the compensatory damages award, thereby reducing the award to 
$507.5 million.). 
112 Id. at 475–76 (The opinion opens with the observation that "[t]here 
are three questions of maritime law before us," and includes the displacement 
issue among those questions of maritime law with words that also could be 
said to limit the scope to punitive damages: "whether punitive damages have 
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Due to either of these factors, Exxon Shipping is arguably limited in its 
precedential value, and thus not rightly counted among the key decisions on 
federal common law.113 Indeed, Justice Souter's opinion utters the term 
"federal common law" only in a statement about the enduring nature of 
maritime law,114 and the most definitive statement about whether the Court's 
assertion of jurisdiction is authorized, which appears in Justice Ginsberg's 
partial concurrence, rested on the fact that the case addressed a maritime 
issue.115 Perhaps of even greater significance vis-à-vis the position of Exxon 
                                                                                                                              
been bared implicitly by federal statutory law making no provision for 
them."). 
113 See, e.g., Native Village of Kivalina, 696 F.3d 849, 865–66 (9th Cir. 
2012) (Pro, J., concurring) (acknowledging differences between Exxon 
Shipping, on the one hand, and Milwaukee II and Middlesex, on the other. 
The concurrence offered two explanations for the differences: Exxon's 
departure from Milwaukee II and Middlesex may be explained by the fact that 
the defendants in Exxon apparently did not argue that the federal maritime 
common law claim was displaced in its entirety and conceded liability and 
compensatory damages. Another explanation may be that the Exxon Court 
viewed [33 U.S.C.] § 1321(o) [a saving provision preserving non-CWA-
based damages liability for injuries caused by discharges of oil and hazardous 
substances] as not so comprehensive as to displace federal maritime common 
law negligence claims for damages, unlike the CWA provisions the 
Milwaukee Court found displaced federal common law nuisance claims. Id. at 
866. Judge Pro ultimately put the case aside, concluding that "Regardless of 
Exxon's effect on the viability of federal maritime common law negligence 
claims for damages under § 1321, Milwaukee II, Middlesex, AEP, and the 
comprehensive nature of the CAA lead to the conclusion that Kivalina's 
federal common law nuisance claim for damages in this case is displaced." 
Id.). 
114 Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 483 (2008) (Souter, J., 
discussing the issue of corporate liability for punitive damages on the basis of 
acts of corporate agents). 
115 Id. at 523 (Ginsberg, J., concurring in part and in part) ("The 
controversy here presented arises under federal maritime jurisdiction," and, 
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Shipping in a displacement discussion is the majority's own characterization 
of "modern-day maritime cases" as uniquely suited to "judicial action to 
modify a common law landscape largely of our own making."116 
Nevertheless, the Court addressed the issue of displacement in language that 
does not limit its applicability to maritime or punitive damages cases in 
absolute terms, and thus its logic cannot be cabined off conclusively.117 
The Exxon Shipping majority's displacement discussion was short and 
straightforward. First, the Court expressed a sensible reluctance to interpret 
legislative silence on existing common law as an intent to displace it, noting 
that "we find it too hard to conclude that a statute expressly geared to 
protecting 'water,' 'shorelines,' and 'natural resources' was intended to 
eliminate sub silentio oil companies' common law duties to refrain from 
                                                                                                                              
beyond question, "the Court possess the power to craft the rule it announces 
today.") (citations omitted). 
116 Id. at 508 n.21. The justification for the Court's development of 
common law is cast as a response to Justice Stevens' partial concurrence-
partial dissent, which faults the Court for "embarking on a new lawmaking 
venture" in its punitive damage analysis. Although at first blush this may 
appear to contradict Justice Stevens' Middlesex dissent, Justice Stevens' 
opinion does not undermine his Middlesex dissent. First, Justice Stevens 
concurred with the section of the Exxon Shipping opinion addressing 
displacement generally. Second, his objection to the section on punitive 
damages confined itself to an examination of admiralty law. Id. at 516–22. 
Generally, Justice Stevens appeared to object primarily to the Court replacing 
an existing jury award. Id. at 522. Thus, the circumstance is nothing like that 
of Middlesex, where the Court's decision left an injury without redress. 
117 Particularly with regard to punitive damages, the Court seemed to 
scoff at the notion of treating those damages like a special class in connection 
with the displacement question. The Court accused Exxon of using an 
"untenable" litigation tactic when it attempted to convince the Court to focus 
its displacement analysis on punitive damages only. "But nothing in the 
statutory text points to fragmenting the recovery scheme in this way, and we 
have rejected similar attempts to sever remedies from their causes of action." 
Id. at 489. 
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injuring the bodies and livelihoods of private individuals."118 The Court next 
identified the core displacement issue as whether a statute indicates an intent 
to "occupy the entire field of pollution," then broke down the analysis of this 
issue into two questions: whether the statute speaks directly to the question 
addressed by the common law, and whether the common law in question 
would have any "frustrating effect" on the federal legislative scheme.119 In a 
footnote, the Court drew a distinction between the displacement question 
before it in Exxon Shipping and those the Court faced in Middlesex and 
Milwaukee, where the common law claims for injunctive relief, if successful, 
would have interfered with CWA-mandated discharge standards. "[P]rivate 
claims for economic injury do not threaten similar interference with federal 
regulatory goals," the Court observed.120 The Court even made note of the 
fact that Exxon, in its brief to the Court, disclaimed taking the position that 
the CWA displaced compensatory remedies for economic injuries resulting 
from water pollution. This indicated a strong presumption that statutes do not 
displace damage claims.121 
The primary distinction between the Exxon Shipping approach and that 
of Middlesex, however, is more significant than the Exxon Shipping Court's 
demonstrated willingness to accept that a federal common law claim may or 
                                                             
118 Id. at 488–89 (rejecting the argument that "any tort action predicated 
on an oil spill is preempted unless [the CWA] expressly preserves it," 
particularly as the CWA contains a savings clause reserving "'obligations . . . 
under any provision of law for damages to any publicly owned or privately 
owned property resulting from a discharge of any oil.'"). Id. at 488 (citing 
CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1321(o)). 
119 Id. at 489 (quoting United States v. Texas, 507 U.S. 529 (1993)). 
120 Exxon Shipping, 554 U.S. at 489 n.7. 
121 Id. at 489 (speculating that Exxon disclaimed this part of its argument 
"[p]erhaps on account of its overbreadth."). The primary focus of this 
passage, and the entire displacement discussion, is on whether the CWA 
displaces punitive damages. The opinion appears to presume that the CWA 
does not displace the federal maritime common law of compensatory 
damages for economic losses. 
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may not threaten interference with the administration of a statute—a question 
that, in many cases, could turn simply on the type of relief sought. It is the 
degree of focus that a court is willing to apply to the question of common law 
and statutory coverage that distinguishes the two brands of displacement 
analysis from one another. Middlesex, its logic grounded in a powerful 
presumption favoring displacement, broadly defined the CWA's coverage to 
encompass all regulation of all waters of the United States, while Exxon 
Shipping, grounded in a presumption favoring common law survival, focused 
far more pointedly on whether the CWA's language or its administration 
actually addresses or prohibits the awarding of common law damages.122 This 
is a key, perhaps unarticulated, distinction between the two cases. 
2. AMERICAN ELECTRIC POWER V. CONNECTICUT—THE 
COURT'S FINAL WORD ON DISPLACEMENT 
In 2007 and 2011, the Court published two key opinions on the CAA, 
Massachusetts v. EPA and AEP.123 Massachusetts affirmed that the CAA 
covers greenhouse gases as a form of pollution, thus mandating the 
development of motor vehicle greenhouse gas emission standards where the 
EPA determines that such gases pose a danger to human health and welfare 
by overheating the atmosphere.124 In its turn, AEP held that the CAA 
                                                             
122 See, e.g., Exxon Shipping, 554 U.S. at 502 (discussing the 
relationship between due process review and punitive damage awards under 
federal maritime law, the Court made clear its approach to the common law 
survival issue: "Our review of punitive damages today, then, considers . . . the 
desirability of regulating them as a common law remedy for which 
responsibility lies with this Court as a source of judge-made law in the 
absence of a statute."). The statement characterizes congressional silence in 
the CWA on the punitive damages issue as "the absence of a statute." Id. 
123 Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 497 (2007); AEP, 131 S. Ct. at 
2527 (2011). 
124 Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 558–59. See Endangerment and Cause of 
Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases Under Section 202(a) of the Clean 
Air Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 66496 (Dec. 15, 2009) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. ch. 
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displaces any right to seek an injunction barring or limiting greenhouse gas 
emissions under federal common law.125 The AEP holding seemed a foregone 
conclusion, as the victory on the scope of the statute in the first of the two 
cases increased the likelihood that the Court would find that a statue of such 
breadth displaced federal common law in the second case. As if in affirmation 
of such predictions, the AEP decision was unanimous.126 Nevertheless, the 
opinion by Justice Ginsberg reveals a level of sensitivity to the law of 
displacement missing from at least one of the Court's prior decisions. 
AEP was a public nuisance action brought by a collection of states, New 
York City, and several private land trusts, against a collection of private 
power companies and the Tennessee Valley Authority. The plaintiffs pled for 
a decree establishing an initial carbon dioxide emissions cap followed by 
annual diminishing carbon dioxide emission levels for each defendant.127 At 
                                                                                                                              
1) (explaining that in 2009, EPA announced its acceptance that anthropogenic 
emissions of six gases account for unprecedented atmospheric greenhouse gas 
concentrations, which pose significant risks to human health and welfare); see 
Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards and Corporate 
Average Fuel Economy Standards; Final Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 25,324 (May 7, 
2010) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 85, 86, 600 and 49 C.F.R. pt. 531, 533, 
536, 537, 538) (explaining the EPA and the National Highway Traffic Safety 
Administration joint regulation, the "Tailpipe Rule," setting light-duty vehicle 
greenhouse gas emission and fuel economy standards). EPA also launched 
rulemaking to address heavier vehicle emissions, and initiated rulemaking to 
set emissions limits for fossil-fuel power plants. 
125 AEP, 131 S. Ct. at 2537 ("We hold that the Clean Air Act and the 
EPA actions it authorizes displace any federal common law right to seek 
abatement of carbon-dioxide emissions from fossil-fuel fired power plants."). 
126 Id. at 2540–41 (Thomas, J., concurring) (expressly agreeing with the 
Court's displacement analysis). 
127 See AEP, 131 S. Ct. at 2533–34 nn.3–5. The AEP plaintiffs included 
California, Connecticut, Iowa, New Jersey, New York, Rhode Island, 
Vermont, Wisconsin, New York City, Open Space Institute, Inc., Open Space 
Conservancy, Inc., and Audubon Society of New Hampshire. The defendants 
were American Electric Power Co., a wholly owned subsidiary of AEP, 
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the appellate level, in a decision preceding Massachusetts, the Second Circuit 
recognized federal common law addressing greenhouse gases, concluding 
that it could not determine whether Congress, in passing the CAA, had 
spoken to the particular issue raised by the plaintiffs unless or until EPA 
issued regulations addressing the matter.128 
The Second Circuit addressed a number of issues integral to common 
law claims, some of which had previously proved troublesome. First, in the 
context of its political question analysis, the court rejected the argument that 
environmental common law cases were too complex for the judiciary, calling 
for courts to tackle unmanageable policy questions about public health, cost, 
and environmental impact. Observing that "federal courts have successfully 
adjudicated complex common law public nuisance cases for over a 
century,"129 after citing multiple cases in which courts had done so, the 
Second Circuit concluded: 
                                                                                                                              
Southern Co., Xcel Energy Inc., and Cinergy Corp. Plaintiffs included claims 
under both the federal common law of public nuisance and state tort law. 
128 Connecticut v. AEP, 582 F.3d 309, 380 (2d Cir. 2009) (concluding 
that "[u]ntil EPA completes the rulemaking process, we cannot speculate as 
to whether the hypothetical regulation of greenhouse gases under the Clean 
Air Act would in fact 'speak[] directly' to the 'particular issue' raised here by 
Plaintiff, which is otherwise governed by federal common law.") (citing to 
County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y. State, 470 U.S. 226, 236–
37 (1985)). 
129 Connecticut, 582 F.3d at 362 (citing Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 
208 (1901) (where Missouri claimed Illinois sewage endangered health of 
Missouri citizens, Court allowed that Missouri could maintain a suit for 
equitable relief before sustaining actual injuries); Missouri v. Illinois, 200 
U.S. 496 (1906) (determining, upon examination of scientific evidence, that 
Missouri had not established that its water pollution emanated from Illinois); 
Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230 (1907) (determining validity of 
Georgia's pollution-based claims and allowing defendants to construct 
emission control structures while also ordering defendants to set up victim 
compensation fund); Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., 237 U.S. 474 (1915) 
(motion to enter final decree ordering specific injunctive relief to reduce 
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Federal courts have long been up to the task of assessing 
complex scientific evidence in cases where the cause of 
action was based either upon the federal common law or 
upon a statute. They are adept in balancing the equities 
and in rendering judgment. The fact that a case may 
present complex issues is not a reason for federal courts 
to shy away from adjudication; when a court is possessed 
of jurisdiction, it generally must exercise it. Additionally, 
the fact that this case is governed by recognized judicial 
standards under the federal common law of nuisance 
"obviates any need to make initial policy decisions of the 
kind normally reserved for nonjudicial discretion" and 
"further undermines the claim that such suits related to 
matters that are constitutionally committed to another 
branch."130 
In connection with its political question analysis, the Second Circuit 
rejected that congressional silence on a matter of national interest should be 
interpreted as a congressional intent that the matter be unaddressed by federal 
                                                                                                                              
sulfur dioxide emissions from several Tennessee plants); Georgia v. Tenn. 
Copper Co., 237 U.S. 678 (1915) (assessing the relevancy of certain facts to 
emissions limits); Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., 240 U.S. 650 (1916) (issuing 
final decree setting emissions limits, imposing monitoring requirements, 
requiring compensation scheme for inspectors, and apportioning costs); New 
Jersey v. City of New York, 283 U.S. 473 (1931) (considering injunction for 
public nuisance for ocean garbage dumping); North Dakota v. Minnesota, 
263 U.S. 365 (1923) (accepting claim for injunction but rejecting damage 
claim where Minnesota's alteration of Illinois River flooded North Dakota 
farmland); New York v. New Jersey, 256 U.S. 296 (1921) (rejecting claim for 
injunction where conflicting evidence made it impossible to determine 
whether New Jersey was polluting New York waters). 
130 Connecticut, 582 F. 3d at 329 (citations omitted) (quoting, in part, 
Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995) (analyzing political question 
doctrine)). 
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common law.131 Adopting a similar approach to the rationale in Justices 
Blackmun and Steven's Milwaukee and Middlesex dissents, the Second 
Circuit adhered to the view that where Congress left regulatory gaps with no 
guidance, it should be presumed that the legislative intent was for common 
law to fill the interstices.132 The court also rejected that global warming, and 
its complex international policy implications, bars the courts from addressing 
via federal common law any and all injuries alleged to have resulted from 
global warming.133 Such nuisance actions require case-by-case analysis, the 
court reasoned, to determine whether a federal common law decision 
establishes or interferes with the development of a national or international 
policy. "[T]he relief for which Plaintiffs pray applies in only the most 
tangential and attenuated way to the expansive domestic and foreign policy 
issues raised by Defendants."134 
The Supreme Court accepted the Second Circuit's political question 
analysis, but rejected the lower court's refusal to reject a federal common law 
claim on the grounds that it was too early to determine whether EPA, in 
regulating under the CAA, would address the very issue at the core of the 
federal common law claim. The Court instead concluded that it was the 
judiciary's task to discern the scope of legislation and whether it displaced 
                                                             
131 Id. at 330 (citing United States v. Texas, 507 U.S. 529, 535 (1993), to 
conclude that "Congress's mere refusal to legislate . . . falls far short of an 
expression of legislative intent to supplant the existing common law in that 
area."). 
132 Id. (citing Khulamani v. Barklay Nat'l Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 287 
(2d Cir. 2007)). 
133 Id. at 324–25 (noting that a domestic suit seeking to abate a public 
nuisance alleged to have caused specific injuries to the plaintiff does not 
authorize a court to set across-the-board or mandatory emissions limitations 
applying to any entities not party to the suit). 
134 Id. at 325. See also id. at 325 n.5 (differentiating the situation where 
plaintiffs seek to limit emissions from six domestic coal-fired electricity 
plants from one in which plaintiffs sued the President "in an effort to force 
him to sign international global warming treaties."). 
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federal common law, regardless of agency implementation or lack thereof.135 
Because the CAA blanketed the subject of greenhouse gas emissions by 
providing for comprehensive emissions standard setting from stationary 
sources, the emissions covered included those deemed responsible for the 
greenhouse effect, and the injunction requested by the plaintiffs would set 
greenhouse gas emissions standards for the defendants, the Court reasoned 
the common law overlapped with the statute in a way that could directly 
obstruct its implementation. There is no legal significance, the Court 
determined, to the question of whether EPA had implemented or planned to 
implement the statute.136 The focus of a displacement inquiry is the statute 
itself.137 
The AEP Court summarized its view on whether the CAA displaces the 
plaintiffs' claims with the simple observation that "[w]e see no room for a 
parallel track."138 The Court implicitly acknowledged that federal statutory 
law and federal common law may coexist where the common law fills a gap 
left by the statute and does not interfere with its operation. In keeping with 
this understanding of the federal common law's role, the Court recognized the 
"new" federal common law, which it described as encompassing national 
                                                             
135 AEP, 131 S. Ct. at 2540 ("The Second Circuit erred, we hold, in 
ruling that federal judges may set limits on greenhouse gas emissions in face 
of a law empowering EPA to set the same limits . . . ."). 
136 Id. at 2538 ("The Clean Air Act is no less an exercise of the 
legislature's 'considered judgment' concerning the regulation of air pollution 
because it permits emissions until EPA acts" (citing Middlesex)). 
137 Id. ("The critical point is that Congress delegated to EPA the decision 
whether and how to regulate carbon-dioxide emissions from power plants; the 
delegation is what displaces federal common law."). 
138 Id. (concluding a discussion of the scope of the CAA, its multiple 
enforcement vehicles, and EPA's current efforts to implement carbon dioxide 
emission standards). 
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concerns that are also within Congress' power to address legislatively.139 The 
Court recognized environmental protection as such a national concern, and as 
such acknowledged that the federal courts bear the authority to fill gaps left 
by statutory law and, "if necessary, even 'fashion federal law.'"140 Although 
the AEP Court rejected the states' federal common law claims before it, the 
displacement analysis was more liberal and sensitive to the utility of federal 
common law than that of some of its predecessor opinions. This makes it all 
the more puzzling that the Court would leave the Ninth Circuit Kivalina 
decision intact. 
The AEP opinion is both thorough in scope and clear in explanation. 
Claiming a "keener understanding" of federal common law than that of the 
Erie Court, the Court recognized the benefits of federal common law as well 
as the limits to of some of the precedents oft-cited by those who would 
smother it.141 The Court's goal was to lay out the various rationales for a 
federal court to decide cases on bases other than federal common law. 
Adopting state common law where possible, the Court observed, is "the 
prudent course."142 Furthermore, the Court noted, it has yet to decide whether 
private citizens or municipalities may invoke federal common law against 
cross-boundary polluters; nor has it defined the parameters of the types of 
cross-boundary pollution that a state may call upon a court to enjoin.143 
Perhaps the most significant worry that the Court expressed dealt with the 
                                                             
139 Id. at 2535 (quoting Henry Friendly, In Praise of Erie—And of the 
New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 383 (1964), to state that Erie 
inspired "the emergence of a federal decisional law in areas of national 
concern."). 
140 AEP, 131 S. Ct. at 2535. 
141 Id. (discussing the new federal common law after clarifying the limits 
to Erie). 
142 Id. at 2536 (quoting United States v. Kimbell Foods, 440 U.S. 715, 
740 (1979)). 
143 Id. (reciting various limits to a federal court's exercise of its power to 
create federal common law). 
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"scale and complexity" of the global warming problem, which it cast as 
differing in nature from "the more bounded pollution giving rise to past 
federal nuisance suits."144 
In spite of its overall goal of controlling applications of federal common 
law, AEP also applied its careful limiting language to itself. The Court's 
statutory analysis interpreted literally the "speaks directly" language at the 
core of the displacement question.145 To be sure, the Court was careful to 
clarify its view that displacement analysis does not require literal duplication 
of action and impact between statute and common law before the statute 
displaces federal common law.146 Nor, the Court pointed out, must all 
potential injuries be addressed under a displacing statute or its implementing 
agency, although the agency's judgment would be subject to court review.147 
The Court offered a relatively nuanced, neutral view of how displacement 
operates. 
Perhaps the most significant limit on the scope of AEP is its holding, 
which applies its finding of displacement to "any federal common law right to 
seek abatement" of greenhouse gas emissions from the defendants' plants, 
thus apparently leaving suits for damages to be examined another day.148 
                                                             
144 Id. 
145 Id. at 2537–38 (parsing the Clean Air Act to find that the statute 
covers greenhouse gas emissions from stationary sources in a plenary 
manner, leaving no room for additional or alternative standards to be 
developed under federal common law); see also id. at 2539 (addressing the 
various tasks assigned EPA under the CAA resulting in a panoply of 
emissions standards). 
146 AEP, 131 S. Ct. at 2538–39. 
147 Id. (clarifying that EPA's delayed or limited application of statutory 
standards is immaterial to the displacement analysis, but that flawed actions 
by the agency could be subject to judicial review under the processes 
included in the statute). 
148 Id. at 2537. 
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Apart from the holding, the opinion might appear to encompass both actions 
for equitable relief and damages, but in fact the Court did limit both its 
discussion and its case references to matters of equity. Exxon Shipping, the 
Court's federal common law decision that focuses directly on forms of relief, 
is neither discussed nor cited in the AEP opinion, and the analyses of both 
AEP and Milwaukee mention that the court-developed standards sought in 
these cases would have interfered with the statutory plan. Thus, AEP logically 
left intact and unaddressed federal common law claims for damages, as a 
claim for injunctive relief will almost unavoidably clash with some discharge 
allowance or potential discharge allowance calculated or to be calculated by 
EPA, while a damages claim seeks payment for an injury sustained by the 
plaintiff, and need face concern with statute-based standards. A defendant's 
compliance with any existing statute-based standards and whether such 
compliance shields the defendant from liability will likely to be critical issues 
in a court's decision on a claim for damages, but unless the successful 
damages claim would significantly impact the behavior of those to whom the 
statute-based standards apply, the common law case could not be said to 
invade or disrupt the statutory program.149 
                                                             
149 The opposing view is that the looming threat of tort liability 
complicates decision-making and operating for regulated parties who already 
may endure technically complex, time-consuming and expensive regulatory 
approval and oversight processes. That viewpoint is considered in cases such 
as International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481 (1987). In International 
Paper Co., which focused on state common law in the aftermath of 
Milwaukee, the Court concluded that inherent in federal legislation cast as 
comprehensive, such as the CWA, is an understanding that dischargers 
should not be vulnerable to unlimited state common law liability when their 
government-sanctioned outflows cause injury. Id. at 497–98. International 
Paper Co. carved out an exception for the common law of the pollution 
source state, which the Court reasoned subjected discharger to a manageable, 
predictable range of liabilities. Id. 
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IV. ASSESSING THE STATUS OF FEDERAL COMMON LAW 
A. NINE SIMPLE TRUTHS OF FEDERAL COMMON LAW 
Careful review of the last century's landmark federal common law cases 
reveals what might be termed a list of simple truths about federal common 
law, stated and repeated by the courts over the decades as they have grappled 
with questions regarding the parameters, function, and utility of federal 
common law. A number of these may be termed cautions against the over-
extension of federal common law. First, courts entertaining federal common 
law claims over the past century seem to agree that federal common law 
should be applied sparingly.150 Second, federal common law should not be 
tolerated where it encourages forum shopping151 or, thirdly, directly interferes 
                                                             
150 See, e.g., AEP, 131 S. Ct. at 2536 ("[T]he Court remains mindful that 
it does not have creative power akin to that vested in Congress."); see also 
Illinois, 406 U.S. at 93 ("It has long been this Court's philosophy that 'our 
original jurisdiction should be invoked sparingly.") (quoting Utah v. United 
States, 394 U.S. 89, 95 (1969)); Milwaukee, 451 U.S. at 312 ("Federal courts, 
unlike state courts, are not general common-law courts and do not possess a 
general power to develop and apply their own rules of decision."); id. at 314 
("[Federal common law] is resorted to '[i]n absence of an applicable Act of 
Congress,' and because the Court is compelled to consider federal questions 
'which cannot be answered from federal statutes alone.'" (quoting Clearfield 
Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 367 (1943)); D'Oench, Duhme & 
Co. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447, 469 (1942)). 
151 Erie R.R, 304 U.S. at 74 (criticizing the doctrine of Swift v. Tyson, 
16 Pet. 1 (1842), as having "introduced grave discrimination by noncitizens 
against citizens. It made rights enjoyed under the unwritten 'general law' vary 
according to whether enforcement was sought in the state or in the federal 
court; and the privilege of selecting the court in which the right should be 
determined was conferred upon the noncitizen. . . . In attempting to promote 
uniformity of law throughout the United States, the doctrine has prevented 
uniformity in the administration of the law of the state."); see also id. at 76 
("In part the discrimination resulted from the wide range of persons held 
entitled to avail themselves of the federal rule by resort to the diversity of 
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with a federal statute.152 A fourth basic tenet of federal common law is that 
where a federal statute directly addresses an injury that is the basis of a 
federal common law plaintiff's claim, the flawed or delayed agency 
administration of the federal statute is immaterial to the core question of 
federal common law's applicability, which is whether Congress has addressed 
the issue that the federal common law claim has placed before a court.153 
                                                                                                                              
citizenship jurisdiction. Through this jurisdiction individual citizens willing 
to remove from their own state and become citizens of another might avail 
themselves of the federal rule." (footnote omitted)). 
152 See, e.g., Milwaukee, 451 U.S. at 313 ("We have always recognized 
that federal common law is 'subject to the paramount authority of Congress.'" 
(citing New Jersey v. New York, 283 U.S. 336, 348 (1931)); see also id. at 
319–20 ("Turning to the particular claims involved in this case, the action of 
Congress in supplanting the federal common law is perhaps clearest when the 
question of effluent limitations for discharges from the two treatment plants is 
considered. The duly issued permits under which the city Commission 
discharges treated sewage from the Jones Island and South Shore treatment 
plants incorporate, as required by the Act, the specific effluent limitations 
established by EPA regulations pursuant to § 301 of the Act. There is thus no 
question that the problem of effluent limitation has been thoroughly 
addressed through the administrative scheme established by Congress, as 
contemplated by Congress. This being so there is no basis for a federal court 
to impose more stringent limitations than those imposed under the regulatory 
regime by reference to federal common law." (references omitted)). 
153 See AEP, 131 S. Ct. at 2538 ("The plaintiffs argue, as the Second 
Circuit held, that federal common law is not displaced until EPA actually 
exercises its regulatory authority, i.e., until it sets standards governing 
emissions from the defendants' plants. We disagree. . . . The critical point is 
that Congress delegated to the EPA the decision whether and how to regulate 
carbon-dioxide emissions from power plants; the delegation is what displaces 
federal common law."). See also Middlesex Cnty. Sewage Auth., 453 U.S. at 
12–13 (rejecting the framing of the issue as whether federal agencies 
breached the statutes involved and whether the defendants breached the terms 
of their federally granted permits). Id. at 13 ("The key to the inquiry is the 
intent of the Legislature."). See also Milwaukee, 451 U.S. at 314 ("[W]hen 
Congress addresses a question previously governed by a decision rested on 
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Finally, where state common law adequately addresses a claimed injury, a 
federal court may decline to apply federal common law.154 
Countering these prohibitions are additional "simple truths" lauding the 
virtues of federal common law. A sixth judicial premise, for example, is that 
courts have acknowledged that federal common law may be appropriately 
applied where an injury is serious and the claim imbued with a level of 
                                                                                                                              
federal common law the need for such an unusual exercise of lawmaking by 
federal courts disappears."). Id. at 315 ("[T]he question was whether the 
legislative scheme 'spoke directly to the question'—in that case the question 
of damages—not whether Congress had affirmatively proscribed the use of 
federal common law." (citing Mobil Oil v. Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 618 
(1978) (determining that The Death on the High Seas Act speaks directly to 
the issue of wrongful death on the high seas, thus displacing general maritime 
law on the issue of damages for loss of society)). See also Native Village of 
Kivalina, 696 F.3d at 858 ("Congressional action, not executive action, is the 
touchstone of displacement analysis."). 
154 See AEP, 131 S. Ct. at 2536 ("Absent a demonstrated need for a 
federal rule of decision, the Court has taken 'the prudent course' of 'adopt[ing] 
the readymade body of state law as the federal rule of decision until Congress 
strikes a different accommodation.'" (quoting United States v. Kimbell Foods, 
Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 740 (1979)). See also Milwaukee, 451 U.S. at 313 ("When 
Congress has not spoken to a particular issue, however, and when there exists 
a 'significant conflict between some federal policy or interest and the use of 
state law,' the Court has found it necessary, in a 'few and restricted' instances, 
to develop federal common law." (quoting Wallis v. Pan American Petroleum 
Corp., 384 U.S. 63, 68 (1966), and Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647, 651 
(1963)). Id. at 314 n.7 ("If state law can be applied, there is no need for 
federal common law; if federal common law exists, it is because state law 
cannot be used."). But see Milwaukee, 451 U.S. at 354 (Blackmun, J., 
dissenting) ("Instead of promoting a more uniform federal approach to the 
problem of alleviating interstate pollution, I fear that today's decision will 
lead States to turn to their own courts for statutory or common-law assistance 
in filling the interstices of the federal statute. Rather than encourage such a 
prospect, I would adhere to the principles clearly enunciated in Illinois v. 
Milwaukee, and affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals."). 
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gravitas that warrants judicial attention.155 The courts have observed that 
federal common law may be appropriate to fill gaps left by statutory law,156 
and also that damage claims may not pose a threat to a federal statutory 
scheme in the direct manner of a common law-based equitable claim.157 As a 
ninth and perhaps most frequently repeated among these judicial 
observations, courts from Georgia through AEP have acknowledged, 
expressly or by virtue of their studied consideration of the pollution-based 
common law claims before them, that federal common law is an appropriate 
legal means for addressing cross-boundary environmental injuries.158 
                                                             
155 See Illinois, 406 U.S. at 93 ("And the question of what is appropriate 
[for the Court to invoke its original jurisdiction] concerns, of course, the 
seriousness and dignity of the claim . . . ."); see also Missouri v. Illinois, 200 
U.S. 496, 521 (1906) ("Before this court ought to intervene, the case should 
be of serious magnitude, clearly and fully proved, and the principle to be 
applied should be one which the court is prepared deliberately to maintain 
against all considerations on the other side.") 
156 See Illinois, 406 U.S. at 103–04 ("The remedy sought by Illinois is 
not within the precise scope of remedies prescribed by Congress. Yet the 
remedies which Congress provides are not necessarily the only federal 
remedies available. . . . The application of federal common law to abate a 
public nuisance in interstate or navigable waters is not inconsistent with the 
Water Pollution Control Act."). See also Milwaukee, 451 U.S. at 323 
(acknowledging that federal common law may fill statutory gaps with the 
observation, "[T]here is no 'interstice' here to be filled by federal common 
law"); AEP, 131 S. Ct. at 2538 (considering whether "a parallel track" for 
federal common law on greenhouse gas emissions exists in light of the CAA 
requirement that EPA address such emissions). 
157 See, e.g., National Sea Clammers Ass'n. v. City of New York, 616 
F.2d 1222, 1234 (1980) (recognizing that a federal common law nuisance 
claim may be brought by private parties for the recovery of damages); Exxon 
Shipping, 554 U.S. at 489 n.7. 
158 See, e.g., Illinois, 406 U.S. at 103 ("When we deal with air and water 
in their ambient or interstate aspects, there is federal common law . . . ." 
(footnote and reference omitted)). See also Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 208, 
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The dissenting opinions of Justices Blackmun and Stevens in Milwaukee 
and Middlesex, far from contradicting these "simple truths" of federal 
common law elicited from multiple leading federal common law cases, 
instead both echo and presage the observations offered by multiple majority 
opinions preceding and following those dissents. As in the Georgia, 
Hinderlider, and Illinois opinions, Justice Blackmun in his Milwaukee dissent 
                                                                                                                              
241 (1901) (holding that federal jurisdiction exists and application of 
nuisance law is appropriate where a state alleges that contagious and 
typhoidal diseases introduced into a river by a neighboring state may spread 
themselves through a neighboring state); Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., 206 
U.S. 230 (1907), at 237 ("[T]he state has an interest . . . in all the earth and air 
within its domain. It has the last word as to whether its mountains shall be 
stripped of their forests and its inhabitants shall breathe pure air. . . . When 
the states by their union made the forcible abatement of outside nuisances 
impossible to each, they did not thereby agree to submit to whatever might be 
done."); Milwaukee, 451 U.S. at 315 n.8 ("[I]nterstate disputes frequently call 
for the application of a federal rule when Congress has not spoken."); id. at 
335 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("Long before the 1972 decision in Illinois v. 
Milwaukee, federal common law enunciated by this Court assured each State 
the right to be free from unreasonable interference with its natural 
environmental and resources when the interference stems from another State 
or its citizens."); Texas, 441 F.2d at 240 ("As the field of federal common law 
has been given necessary expansion into matters of federal concern and 
relationship (where no federal statute exists, as there does not here), the 
ecological rights of a State in the improper impairment of them from sources 
outside the State's own territory, now would and should, we think, be held to 
be a matter having basis and standard in federal common law and so directly 
constituting a question arising under the laws of the United States."); id. at 
242 ("[W]e hold that . . . the ecological controversy involved is one which is 
entitled to the application of federal common law as a basis for the existence 
and determination of the rights in the situation . . . ."); Native Village of 
Kivalina, 696 F.3d at 855–56 (acknowledging the history of federal common 
law applications to transboundary pollution suits); AEP, 131 S. Ct. at 2535 
("Environmental protection is undoubtedly an area 'within national legislative 
power,' one in which federal courts may fill in 'statutory interstices,' and, if 
necessary, even 'fashion federal law.'" (quoting Henry Friendly, In Praise of 
Erie—And of the New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 383 (1964)). 
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asserted the appropriateness of federal common law as a complement to 
statutory law, as well as its unique utility in interstate disputes.159 Similarly, 
as in the Missouri and AEP opinions, Justice Stevens in his Middlesex dissent 
pointed to the daunting complexity of environmental cases as a motivation for 
                                                             
159 See Milwaukee, 451 U.S. at 333–34 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) 
("[T]he Court assumes that as soon as Congress 'addresses a question 
previously governed' by federal common law, 'the need for such an unusual 
exercise of lawmaking by federal courts disappears.' This 'automatic 
displacement' approach is inadequate in two respects. It fails to reflect the 
unique role federal common law plays in resolving disputes between one 
State and the citizens of government of another. In addition, it ignores this 
Court's frequent recognition that federal common law may complement 
congressional action in the fulfillment of federal policies."). Id. at 336 ("If the 
federal interest is sufficiently strong, federal common law may be drawn 
upon in settling disputes even through the statute or Constitution along 
provides no precise answer to the question posed."). See also id. at 335 
("Both before and after Erie, the Court has fashioned federal law where the 
interstate nature of a controversy renders inappropriate the law of either 
State."). For like sentiments expressed in earlier Supreme Court majority 
opinions, see Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., 206 U.S. at 238 ("It is a fair and 
reasonable demand on the part of a sovereign that the air over its territory 
should not be polluted on a great scale . . . by the acts of persons beyond its 
control."); Hinderlider, 304 U.S. at 104–05 (acknowledging that a water 
rights dispute between states "could obviously have been determined by a suit 
in this Court"); id. at 110 (stating that "whether the water of an interstate 
stream must be apportioned between the two States is a question of 'federal 
common law' upon which neither the statutes nor the decisions of either State 
can be conclusive. Jurisdiction over controversies concerning rights in 
interstate streams is not different from those concerning boundaries. These 
have been recognized as presenting federal questions." (citations and 
footnotes omitted)); Illinois, 406 U.S. at 99 ("The question is whether 
pollution of interstate or navigable waters creates actions arising under the 
'laws' of the United States within the meaning of § 1331(a). We hold that it 
does . . . ."). 
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federal courts to shy away from federal common law actions.160 It is the 
prioritization of justice over all other considerations that relegated the 
expressions of such sentiments by Justices Blackmun and Stevens to the 
status of dissenters.161 Justice Blackmun insisted that federal common law be 
                                                             
160 See Middlesex, 453 U.S. at 25 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part) ("The touchstone now is congressional intent. Because 
legislative history is unlikely to reveal affirmative evidence of a 
congressional intent to authorize a specific procedure that the statute itself 
fails to mention, that touchstone will further restrict the availability of private 
remedies."). Id. at 31 ("The effect of the Court's holding in Milwaukee was to 
make the city of Milwaukee's compliance with the requirements of the Clean 
Water Act a complete defense to a federal common-law nuisance action for 
pollution damage. It was, and still is, difficult for me to reconcile that holding 
with the . . . statutes and the Senate Report . . . particularly the statement: 
'Compliance with requirements under this Act would not be a defense to a 
common law action for pollution damages.' S. REP. NO. 92-414, at 81 (1971), 
1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3746 (1972). Today, the Court pursues the pre-emption 
rationale of Milwaukee v. Illinois to its inexorable conclusion and holds that 
even noncompliance with the requirements of the Clean Water Act and the 
MPRSA is a defense to a federal common-law nuisance claim."). For 
observations on the complexity of environmental law in earlier and later 
cases, see, e.g., Missouri, 200 U.S. at 522 (discussing the difficulty of the 
science involved in that case); AEP, 131 S. Ct. at 2539–40 ("It is altogether 
fitting that Congress designated an expert agency, here, EPA, as best suited to 
serve as primary regulator of greenhouse gas emissions. . . . Federal judges 
lack the scientific, economic, and technological resources an agency can 
utilize in coping with issues of this order. Judges may not commission 
scientific studies or convene groups of experts for advice, or issue rules under 
notice-and-comment procedures inviting input by any interested person, or 
seek the counsel of regulators in the States where the defendants are located. 
Rather, judges are confined by a record comprising the evidence the parties 
present."). 
161 See Middlesex, 453 U.S. at 24 ("[R]ules are meant to be obeyed, and 
those who violate them should be held responsible for their misdeeds."). 
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relied upon to provide uniformity on issues of national scope.162 Justice 
Stevens declared that the mission of the judiciary is first and foremost the 
remedying of injuries. He then faulted the majority for deflecting difficult 
cases due to administrative concerns.163 In Justice Stevens' words: 
First, we must assume that the complaint speaks the truth 
when it alleges that the petitioners have dumped large 
quantities of sewage and toxic waste in the Atlantic 
Ocean and its tributaries, and that these dumping 
operations have violated the substantive provisions of the 
Clean Water Act and the MPRSA. Second, we must also 
assume that these illegal operations have caused an 
injury to respondents' commercial interests . . . . Finally, 
we must assume that, apart from these two statutes, the 
dumping operations of petitioners would constitute a 
common-law nuisance for which respondents would 
have a federal remedy. The net effect of the Court's 
analysis of the legislative intent is therefore a conclusion 
that Congress, by enacting the Clean Water Act and the 
MPRSA, deliberately deprived respondents of effective 
federal remedies that would otherwise have been 
available to them.164 
These sentiments could have been part of the Supreme Court's decision 
on whether to accept certiorari in Kivalina. Certainly global warming is an 
issue for which a uniform judicial policy would make sense. Certainly the 
injury claimed is serious and deserving of the dignity inherent in the Supreme 
Court's attention. Most certainly of all, the current Court's cautious approach 
                                                             
162 Milwaukee, 451 U.S. at 337 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("If the 
federal interest is sufficiently strong, federal common law may be drawn 
upon in settling disputes even though the statute or Constitution alone 
provides no precise answer to the question posed."). 
163 Middlesex, 453 U.S. at 24 ("Since the earliest days of the common 
law, it has been the business of courts to fashion remedies for wrongs."). 
164 Id. at 27. 
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to federal common law left the Kivalina plaintiffs with unremedied injuries, 
at least on the federal level. 
B. THREE APPROACHES TO DISPLACEMENT 
The Supreme Court's decision to deny certiorari to Kivalina may be 
interpreted in a number of ways. It is very possible, for example, that the 
Court intended to signal that it considered the distinction between a federal 
common law case seeking equitable relief and one seeking damages to be 
meaningless for purposes of displacement analysis.165 Where a statute 
addresses a national interest on a scale that Congress deems comprehensive, 
the Court will look no further to determine whether federal common law 
would disrupt or duplicate the statute's operation, and will not consider 
whether federal common law might provide redress for injuries ignored by 
the statute.166 Disruption is assumed, and non-responsiveness to certain 
injuries must be part of Congress' plan.167 If this is the message from 
                                                             
165 See, e.g., Native Village of Kivalina, 696 F.3d at 857 ("In Middlesex, 
the Supreme Court considered a public nuisance claim of damage to fishing 
grounds caused by discharges and ocean dumping of sewage. The Court held 
that the cause of action was displaced, including the damage remedy. Thus, 
under current Supreme Court jurisprudence, if a cause of action is displaced, 
displacement is extended to all remedies." (citations omitted)). 
166 See, e.g., Milwaukee, 451 U.S. at 317 ("Congress has not left the 
formulation of appropriate federal standards to the courts through application 
of often vague and indeterminate nuisance concepts and maxims of equity 
jurisprudence, but rather has occupied the field through the establishment of a 
comprehensive regulatory program supervised by an expert administrative 
agency."). See also id. at 319, distinguishing itself from Illinois ("The 
establishment of such a self-consciously comprehensive program by 
Congress, which certainly did not exist when Illinois v. Milwaukee was 
decided, strongly suggests that there is no room for courts to attempt to 
improve on that program with federal common law."). 
167 See, e.g., Native Village of Kivalina, 696 F.3d at 856 ("We need not 
engage in that complex issue and fact-specific analysis in this case, because 
we have direct Supreme Court guidance. The Supreme Court has already 
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Kivalina, then the current Court embraces a presumptive displacement 
mindset much like that of the Middlesex Court.168 This seems unlikely in light 
of AEP, which, although citing Middlesex approvingly for the proposition 
that a federal agency's manner of administering its legislative mandates does 
not impact the displacement decision, presented a more focused displacement 
analysis than Middlesex.169 
On the other end of the displacement spectrum is the view presented by 
Justice Stevens in his Middlesex dissent, whereby there exists a presumptive 
coexistence of federal statutory and common law, with the core question of a 
displacement analysis being whether an injury over which the federal courts 
have jurisdiction would be left without redress absent federal common law to 
                                                                                                                              
determined that Congress has directly addressed the issue of domestic 
greenhouse gas emissions from stationary sources and has therefore displaced 
federal common law."). 
168 Middlesex focused primarily on analysis of citizen suit provisions 
and other statutory rights of action. The opinion dispenses with the federal 
common law displacement issue without analysis, claiming reliance on 
Milwaukee. 
The Court has now held that the federal common law of 
nuisance in the area of water pollution is entirely pre-empted 
by the more comprehensive scope of the FWPCA . . . . This 
decision [Milwaukee] disposes entirely of respondents' federal 
common-law claims, since there is no reason to suppose that 
the pre-emptive effect of the FWPCA is any less when 
pollution of coastal waters is at issue. 
Middlesex, 453 U.S. at 21–22. The Middlesex decision may not be as absolute 
a rejection of federal common law as its reputation may suggest. The Court 
specifically refrained from addressing "the question whether the federal 
common law of nuisance could ever be the basis of a suit for damages by a 
private party." Id. at 11 n.17. 
169 AEP, 131 S. Ct. at 2535 (claiming "a keener understanding" of 
federal common law than that of earlier generations and then acknowledging 
that Erie sparked an emergence of federal common law on issues of national 
concern) (reference omitted). 
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fill the gaps in a statutory program.170 Although the AEP opinion's reference 
to parallel tracks indicates an open-mindedness to the idea of statutory law 
and common law complementing one another in addressing matters of 
national concern, the facts of Kivalina indicate that the current Court has not 
embraced Justice Stevens' pro-federal common law view. After all, the 
concern in Kivalina, cross-boundary pollution, is national in scope. The relief 
requested, compensation for Kivalina's relocation, was finite and did not 
threaten the defendants' continued operation vis-à-vis the CAA. Most 
significantly, the injury to Kivalina goes unredressed under federal law 
without the Court's recognition that federal common law has a part to play in 
repairing the harm to the tribe.171 Kivalina seems to be the exact type of 
circumstance that troubled Justices Stevens and Blackmun.172 If today's Court 
is troubled by Kivalina's plight, it certainly does not share these Justices' 
perspective on how displacement law may take those troubles into account. 
                                                             
170 See Middlesex, 453 U.S. at 22–27 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part) (pointing out that the majority view on displacement 
deprives a party injured by the pollution of another party of any effective 
federal remedies). 
171 See Native Village of Kivalina, 696 F.3d at 858 (acknowledging that 
the court's application of displacement leaves Kivalina at the mercy of the 
legislative and executive branches, as well as the sea). 
172 Milwaukee, 451 U.S. at 338–39 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) 
("Congress had 'spoken to' the particular problem of interstate water pollution 
as far back as 1888, and in 1948 did so in a broad and systematic fashion with 
the enactment of the Water Pollution Control Act (also known as the Clean 
Water Act). In Illinois v. Milwaukee, the Court properly regarded such 
expressions of congressional intent as not an obstacle but an incentive to 
application of the federal common law. The fact that Congress in 1972 once 
again addressed the complicated and difficult problem of purifying our 
Nation's waters should not be taken as presumptive evidence, let alone 
conclusive proof, that Congress meant to foreclose pre-existing approaches to 
controlling interstate water pollution. Where the possible extinction of federal 
common law is at issue, a reviewing court is obligated to look not only at the 
magnitude of the legislative action but also with some care to the evidence of 
specific congressional intent."). 
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A third approach to the displacement issue lies between the two 
extremes, requiring a nuanced case-by-case analysis that focuses on the 
question of whether Congress has asserted plenary control over a matter 
formerly the subject of federal common law with sensitivity to both the 
potential for common law to interfere with the statutory program and the 
potential for common law to fill statutory gaps.173 The AEP Court appeared to 
endorse such an approach, although with a marked propensity to cede to 
Congress all control over matters of national importance where Congress has 
staked out its authority.174 
The case-by-case approach, of course, warrants that the Court address 
the still unanswered question of whether a public nuisance action seeking 
damages presents a circumstance where federal common law neither 
threatens nor obstructs the CAA. The Court's decision against taking up this 
opportunity to provide guidance on this issue prompts several interpretations. 
First, it seems likely that the Court considers Exxon Shipping an outlier case, 
                                                             
173 AEP, 131 S. Ct. at 2537 ("The test for whether congressional 
legislation excludes the declaration of federal common law is simply whether 
the statute 'speak[s] directly to [the] question' at issue." (citing Mobil Oil 
Corp. v. Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 618, 625 (1978)). 
174 Id. at 2537–38 (finding that the CAA directs EPA to establish carbon 
dioxide emission standards from the defendants, and also provides multiple 
avenues for enforcement, including enforcement against EPA for refraining 
from setting required standards stating "the Act itself thus provides a means 
to seek limits on emissions of carbon dioxide from domestic power plants—
the same relief the plaintiffs seek by invoking federal common law."); id. at 
2538–39 ("The critical point is that Congress delegated to EPA the decision 
whether and how to regulate carbon-dioxide emissions from power plants; the 
delegation is what displaces federal common law. Indeed, were EPA to 
decline to regulate carbon-dioxide emissions altogether at the conclusion of 
its ongoing section 7411 rulemaking, the federal courts would have not 
warrant to employ the federal common law of nuisance to upset the agency's 
expert determination."). 
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limited in precedential scope to cases arising under maritime law.175 As noted 
above, in AEP the Court did not mention Exxon Shipping, which was its latest 
statement on federal common law at the time. In addition, the Court's 
decision against hearing Kivalina indicates that it does not perceive there to 
be a conflict between Exxon Shipping and Middlesex. In other words, the 
Court considers Exxon Shipping to be limited as a precedent to the punitive 
damages issue that case put before the Court, which Justice Souter's opinion 
proves that the Court considered itself eminently capable of handling, while 
Kivalina is more akin to Middlesex for the simple reason that it presents a 
cross-boundary environmental problem that the Court considers too unwieldy 
for the judicial setting. 
C. MASSACHUSETTS V. EPA ON FEDERAL COMMON LAW 
If the scientific uncertainty is so profound that it 
precludes EPA from making a reasoned judgment as to 
whether greenhouse gases contribute to global warming, 
EPA must say so. That EPA would prefer not to regulate 
greenhouse gases because of some residual uncertainty 
. . . is irrelevant.176 
Perhaps the most reasoned interpretation of the Court's decision against 
hearing Kivalina, then, is that it chooses to leave the issue of global warming 
to the regulators.177 The "culprit" justifying the hands-off approach is 
                                                             
175 See Exxon Shipping, 554 U.S. at 481 (defining the pertinent issue as 
"We granted certiorari to consider . . . whether the Clean Water Act 
forecloses the award of punitive damages in maritime spill cases."). 
176 Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 534 (2007). 
177 AEP, 131 S. Ct. at 2538 (concluding that the CAA displaces federal 
common law, stating "As Milwaukee II made clear, . . . the relevant question 
for purposes of displacement is 'whether the field has been occupied not 
whether it has been occupied in a particular manner.' Of necessity, Congress 
selects different regulatory regimes to address different problems. Congress 
could hardly preemptively prohibit every discharge of carbon dioxide unless 
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Massachusetts v. EPA, the 2007 decision that both established the CAA's 
coverage of gases contributing to global warming and, in so doing, launched 
a series of EPA efforts to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from both 
mobile and stationary sources. On its face, the Kivalina declination to address 
global warming through federal common law on the basis of its own recent 
declaration of EPA's regulatory responsibilities makes sense, as a century of 
Supreme Court cases have held fast to the premise that federal common law 
gives way to comprehensive federal regulation where court decisions may 
replicate, contradict, or otherwise confuse the regulatory program in a manner 
that threatens to disrupt it. Thus, one may conclude, Massachusetts 
precipitated the environmental losses in both AEP and Kivalina. When Justice 
Stevens' Massachusetts majority opinion is considered more closely, 
however, it appears to be more in keeping with the sentiments of Justice 
Blackmun's Milwaukee dissent and Justice Stevens' own Middlesex dissent 
than it is with the majority opinions in the federal common law cases that 
presumptively displace wherever a justification may be identified. 
First, Justice Stevens does not shy away from evaluating the science of 
anthropogenic global warming, even where EPA, the so-called experts on 
environmental science, have concluded that the science is too uncertain to act 
upon.178 Justice Stevens evaluates the science and concluded that EPA's 
inaction was not justified on the basis of the persistent dispute over mankind's 
                                                                                                                              
covered by a permit. After all, we each emit carbon dioxide merely by 
breathing."). 
178 Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 504–09 (evaluating the scientific studies 
asserting anthropogenic global warming over the decades); id. at 521 ("The 
harms associated with climate change are serious and well-recognized."); id. 
at 523 ("EPA does not dispute the existence of a causal connection between 
manmade greenhouse gas emissions and global warming. At a minimum, 
therefore, EPA's refusal to regulate such emissions 'contributes' to 
Massachusetts' injuries."); id. at 524 ("[R]educing domestic automobile 
emissions is hardly a tentative step. Even leaving aside the other greenhouse 
gases, the United States transportation sector emits an enormous quantity of 
carbon dioxide into the atmosphere . . . ."). 
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contributions to the greenhouse gas problem.179 Although Justice Stevens was 
accused of taking political action,180 in actuality he was calling out 
politicking where a statute did not allow it.181 According to the majority, the 
                                                             
179 Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 534–35 ("The statutory question is 
whether sufficient information exists to make an endangerment finding. . . . 
EPA has offered no reasoned explanation for its refusal to decide whether 
greenhouse gases cause or contribute to climate change. Its action was 
therefore 'arbitrary, capricious, . . . or otherwise not in accordance with law.' 
. . . [E]PA must ground its reasons for action or inaction in the statute." 
(citations omitted)). 
180 Id. at 547 (Roberts, J., dissenting) ("The constitutional role of the 
courts, however, is to decide concrete cases—not to serve as a convenient 
forum for policy debate."). See also id. at 558 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Once 
again, in the face of textual ambiguity, the Court's application of Chevron 
deference to EPA's interpretation of the word 'including' is nowhere to be 
found. Evidently, the Court defers only to those reasonable interpretations it 
favors." (footnote omitted)); id. at 560 ("The Court's alarm over global 
warming may or may not be justified, but it ought no distort the outcome of 
this litigation. This is a straightforward administration-law case, in which 
Congress has passed a malleable statute giving broad discretion, not to us but 
to an executive agency. No matter how important the underlying policy issues 
at stake, this Court has no business substituting its own desired outcome for 
the reasoned judgment of the responsible agency."). 
181 Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 533–34 ("Under the clear terms of the 
Clean Air Act, EPA can avoid taking further action only if it determines that 
greenhouse gases do not contribute to climate change or if it provides some 
reasonable explanation as to why it cannot or will not exercise its discretion 
to determine whether they do. . . . [E]PA has refused to comply with this clear 
statutory command. Instead, it has offered a laundry list of reasons not to 
regulate. For example, EPA said that a number of voluntary Executive 
Branch programs already provide an effective response to the threat of global 
warming, that regulating greenhouse bases might impair the President's 
ability to negotiate with 'key developing nations' to reduce emissions, and that 
curtaining motor-vehicle emissions would reflect 'an inefficient, piecemeal 
approach to address the climate change issue.' Although we have neither the 
expertise nor the authority to evaluate these policy judgments, it is evident 
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CAA provision under review required scientific study and science-based 
conclusions regardless of agency politics.182 Justice Stevens' exertion of the 
Court's judicial power to force the execution of legislation was, in spirit, 
diametrically opposed to the judicial stance taken in Middlesex, AEP, and the 
Ninth Circuit Kivalina opinion, all cases in which the judiciary deemed itself 
impotent in the face of a statute authorizing a comprehensive regulatory 
scheme, regardless of the actual implementation of that scheme.183 The 
hands-on Massachusetts majority opinion is far more akin to the Exxon 
Shipping opinion, where the Court exercised its authority to address, directly, 
a policy the Court perceived as unfair or at least inappropriate. 
                                                                                                                              
they have nothing to do with whether greenhouse gas emissions contribute to 
climate change. Still less do they amount to a reasoned justification for 
declining to form a scientific judgment."). 
182 Id. at 534 ("Nor can EPA avoid its statutory obligation by noting the 
uncertainty surrounding various features of climate change and concluding 
that it would therefore be better not to regulate at this time."). 
183 See, e.g., Middlesex, 453 U.S. at 12 (refusing to address respondents' 
claims that the federal agencies entrusted with protecting against illegal 
discharges to waters of the United States had permitted dumping in excess of 
the amounts permitted under federal law and that the defendant states had 
violated the terms of these permits). See AEP, 131 S. Ct. at 2539–40 ("The 
expert agency is surely better equipped to do the job [of regulating 
greenhouse gas emissions] than individual district judges issuing ad hoc, 
case-by-case injunctions. Federal judges lack the scientific, economic, and 
technological resources an agency can utilize in coping with issues of this 
order. Judges may not commission scientific studies or convene groups of 
experts for advice, or issues rules under notice-and-comment procedures 
inviting input by any interested person, or seek the counsel of regulators in 
the States where the defendants are located. Rather, judges are confined by a 
record comprising the evidence the parties presented. Moreover, federal 
district judges, sitting as sole adjudicators, lack authority to render 
precedential decisions binding other judges, even members of the same 
court."). 
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Secondly, in Massachusetts Justice Stevens rejected the argument that 
the scope and complexity of global warming render it inappropriate for the 
judicial format. In the context of the standing discussion, Justice Stevens 
assailed "the erroneous presumption that a small incremental step, because it 
is incremental, can never be attacked in a federal judicial forum."184 He 
rejected the premise that projected gas emission from China and India should 
strip the U.S. judiciary of its power to address domestic emissions due to the 
inseparable and nondomestic nature of the greenhouse gas effect and its 
impacts.185 Again, the spirit of Justice Stevens' approach was the opposite of 
that taken in Middlesex and AEP, where the majorities appeared to bow with 
relief before the scientific complexities of global warming, declaring 
themselves unequal to the task of discerning individual victims or purveyors 
amid the political machinations.186 The Massachusetts majority seemed more 
in line with the Second Circuit's approach in AEP, where the Court seized on 
a perceived wrong and addressed it.187 
                                                             
184 Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 499 ("Agencies, like legislatures, do not 
generally resolve massive problems in one fell swoop, but instead whittle 
away over time, refining their approach as circumstances change and they 
develop a more nuanced understanding of how best to proceed." (references 
omitted)). 
185 Id. at 525–26 ("Nor is it dispositive that developing countries such as 
China and India are poised to increase greenhouse gas emission substantially 
over the next century: a reduction in domestic emissions would slow the pace 
of global emissions increases, no matter what happens elsewhere."). 
186 See, e.g., AEP, 131 S. Ct. at 253 n.2 ("The Court, we caution, 
endorses no particular view of the complicated issues related to carbon-
dioxide emissions and climate change."). 
187 Connecticut v. American Electric Power, 582 F.3d 309, 326 (2d Cir. 
2009), rev'd, 131 S. Ct. 2527, 180 L. Ed. 2d 435 (U.S. 2011) ("[F]ederal 
courts have successfully adjudicated complex common law public nuisance 
cases for over a century."); id. at 328 ("Federal courts have applied well-
settled tort rules to a variety of new and complex problems."); id. at 329 
("The fact that a case may present complex issues is not a reason for federal 
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Massachusetts cannot be compared with AEP or even Middlesex on the 
primary substantive issue addressed in those cases, as Massachusetts was not 
a federal common law case. But in terms of the decision being the product of 
an activist bench that considered its highest priority the righting of wrongs 
and where its role complemented the federal regulatory system, 
Massachusetts finds kinship with the views that Justices Blackmun and 
Stevens expressed on federal common law in their Milwaukee and Middlesex 
dissents. If one of the two Justices were on the bench today, there might have 
been a dissent issued, protesting the Court's decision against accepting 
certiorari in Kivalina. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Our conclusion obviously does not aid Kivalina, which 
itself is being displaced by the rising sea. But the 
solution of Kivalina's dire circumstances must rest in the 
hands of the legislative and executive branches of our 
government, not the federal common law.188 
"[W]e are acting here in the position of a common law court of law 
review, faced with a perceived defect in a common law remedy," Justice 
Souter wrote in Exxon Shipping, apparently perceiving a need to justify the 
Court's federal common law activism in that 2008 opinion.189 In contrast, the 
Court has exhibited no such need to rationalize its recent non-activism. 
Without comment, the Supreme Court's denial of certiorari in Kivalina leaves 
intact a Ninth Circuit decision that harkens back to Middlesex, arguably the 
                                                                                                                              
courts to shy away from adjudication; when a court is possessed of 
jurisdiction, it generally must exercise it."). 
188 Native Village of Kivalina, 696 F.3d 849, 858 (9th Cir. 2012), cert. 
denied, 133 S. Ct. 2390, 185 L. Ed. 2d 1116 (U.S. 2013) (basing the holding 
entirely on displacement doctrine, which the court deems blind to the issue of 
remedies). 
189 Exxon Shipping, 554 U.S. at 507 (admitting that "some will murmur 
that this [development of a punitive-to-compensatory damage ration] smacks 
too much of policy and too little of principle."). 
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most egregious in a line of cases that presumptively eradicate federal 
common law with only the shallowest form of displacement analysis. More 
significantly, however, the Supreme Court's decision against hearing Kivalina 
leaves AEP as its final statement to date on federal common law. That 
decision, far from echoing the logic or spirit of Middlesex, acknowledged the 
concurrent utility of regulatory and federal common law where federal 
common law may complement a regulatory program without interfering with 
it. Thus, the Court leaves federal common law in a state of ambiguity. 
